




# ***JPRS Report***



# **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CONTENTS

4 September 1991

### BULGARIA

BSDP Leader Dertliev on Political Culture [SVOBODEN NAROD 8 Aug]	1
BZNS-United Leader on Opposition Goals [SVOBODEN NAROD 25 Jul]	3
Changes in Labor Relations Analyzed [DELOVI SVYAT 22 Jul]	4
Police Official on Money Laundering [SVOBODEN NAROD 26 Jul]	5
Conflicts Within Ecoglasnost Analyzed [KULTURA 5 Jul]	6

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czech Political Parties Described [REPORTER 1 Aug]	9
Short Profiles of Political Parties	11
Liberal Democratic Party [LIDOVE NOVINY 27 Jul]	11
Conservative Party-Free Bloc [LIDOVE NOVINY 29 Jul]	11
Czechoslovak Socialist Party [LIDOVE NOVINY 30 Jul]	11
Agrarian Party [LIDOVE NOVINY 31 Jul]	12
Club of Nonaligned Activists [LIDOVE NOVINY 1 Aug]	12
Movement for Czech/Slovak Accord [LIDOVE NOVINY 2 Aug]	12
Left Alternative [LIDOVE NOVINY 3 Aug]	12
Romany Civic Initiative [LIDOVE NOVINY 5 Aug]	12
Civic Democratic Alliance [LIDOVE NOVINY 6 Aug]	13
Romany National Congress [LIDOVE NOVINY 7 Aug]	13
Association of Social Democrats [LIDOVE NOVINY 25 Jul]	13
National Socialist Party [LIDOVE NOVINY 26 Jul]	13
Parties on the Right Plan Unification [REPORTER 1 Aug]	13
Additional Obstacles Seen in Federation's Way [SVOBODNE SLOVO 7 Aug]	15
Moral Values Preferred to Nationalism [LISTY No 3 1991]	15
Czech Actor Defines His Nation's Identity [LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Aug]	16
Kubat's Concept of Agriculture Supported [LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Aug]	17

### HUNGARY

Kupa for Shrinking State's Role in Privatization [MAGYAR HIRLAP 23 Jul]	19
Smallholders' New Role Seen 'Left of MDF' [MAGYAR HIRLAP 25 Jul]	19
Law on Private Legal Practice Liberalized [NEPSZAVA 26 Jul]	20
Government Ministers' Incomes Partly Tax Exempt [NEPSZAVA 26 Jul]	21
Signature Campaign Against Compensation Law [MAGYAR HIRLAP 20 Jul]	21
'Thousands' of Chinese Settling in Budapest [NEPSZAVA 26 Jul]	22

### POLAND

More Pessimism, Devaluation of Institutions Noted [ZYCIE WARSZAWY 27-28 Jul]	23
Personnel, Structural Changes in Army Viewed [SLOWO POLSKIE 26 Jul]	24
New Tariffs Provide Some Relief to Farmers [RZECZPOSPOLITA 2 Aug]	26
Livestock, Meat Product Imports Upset Farmers [RZECZPOSPOLITA 25 Jul]	27
Status, Quality of Oat Production Noted [RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Jul]	27
Rye Harvest Menaced by High Costs, Low Demand [RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Jul]	28
List of 80 Top Polluting Firms Reexamined [RZECZPOSPOLITA 29 Jul]	28
Rehabilitation Community for Addicts Planned [TRYBUNA 5 Aug]	29

**BDSP Leader Dertliev on Political Culture**

91BA1025A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian  
8 Aug 91 pp 1-3

[Interview with Dr. Petur Dertliev, chairman of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, by Vladimir Trifonov; place and date not given: "The Limits of Democracy"]

[Text] [Trifonov] Mr. Dertliev, we live under the sign of confusions. Manipulated by trade unions and political leaders, the human mass becomes extremely dangerous, motivated by feelings of impunity and total permissiveness.

[Dertliev] The correlation between the mass and the individual exists in modern times. The human mass needs today's democracy. However, it must be guided by a mental process. Without it it becomes a thoughtless crowd which can be set afire with a single word or a slogan, which is very dangerous. In these times of street meetings, it is the clever and the cunning who need the crowd. The clever swimmer also dives under the wave in order not to be crushed by it. He then emerges behind it and uses it to swim ahead. Our parliament includes many such swimmers who keep demonstrating effective dives. Hours of meaningless blabber in the adoption of the agenda are nothing but the frenzied wish to show oneself up, to move ahead.... This is a typical communist mannerism. We are still stuffed with communism. Its rejection is a matter of time. I do not believe that we shall change in a one day. This may be for those who have played some kind of a role throughout their lifetime. They were not sincere as communists and nor are they sincere today, as anticommunists. Their efforts to please the crowd and their dizzying twists are motivated exclusively by greed. I reject any kind of dictatorship, regardless of its objectives.

[Trifonov] Judging by some statements and actions of the "39," the impression is left that these people are eager for clashes. The forgotten actions of the "nine-September people" are being revived.

[Dertliev] They simply fail to realize that words are like bullets. This is particularly relevant in terms of their street-meeting activities. In such meetings even literary exaggerations could turn into barbaric brutality. That is why those who stand in front of the microphone must clearly realize their responsibility. Yet, they calmly say: "But we never told them to do that." How naive can they be, not to say something else? One must know what could follow an appeal and one should prevent primitive actions. If one is unable to do so, better not get up on the rostrum. For down there one finds people with a tremendous predisposition for undemocratic actions and any thoughtless word could provide a reason and justification for such actions.

Let me give you a personal example from the time when people started criticizing me. From the various rostrums I was described as a "conciliatorist." The next question

was: "With whom? Naturally, with the communists. Therefore, he is a traitor." The next step was summed up as follows: "A traitor? But whom is he betraying? The people. Let us take care of him, then!" You can see the results—beaten-up deputies. "But we did not do it," say our "radical" friends. It was precisely you who did it, gentlemen, for when you launched those appeals you should have been able to predict who would be listening to them and what they would trigger.

[Trifonov] But what if it was precisely this that they had anticipated?

[Dertliev] That makes them immoral. Anyone has the full right to reject one's opponents who hold different ideas. But when one deliberately influences the people's feelings, particularly the most frenzied ones, the only word that fits is "immorality."

[Trifonov] "People whose behinds have been hit are clamoring for the ennoblement of their wounds" is a quotation from a recent poem by Konstantin Pavlov. Are you familiar with such "characters?"

[Dertliev] Such people are legion. There are those who from ministers became ministers plenipotentiary. Others who claim, if you can imagine this, that they were looked at askance. Others again claim to have been forced to commit base actions. The only people who are ignored were those who were profoundly wounded.

[Trifonov] Do you concede that to this day criminals are being deliberately used in pursuit of political objectives?

[Dertliev] Naturally. In such times of crises they always come out and are useful to someone. Their greed and sadistic inclinations... are features which give them an excellent chance for being hired.

[Trifonov] By whom?

[Dertliev] By extreme forces, regardless of their color. The spirit of communism is alive. It is crowded with violence, revenge, and dictatorship. The end of all this will come when nonviolence becomes organized.

[Trifonov] Who will accomplish this?

[Dertliev] To begin with, those who suffered from violence. Let me quote Asen Zlatarov: "Suffering makes the strong wise and breaks the weak." Then we have the institutions of the state. It is true that at present they are paralyzed and that in Bulgaria one could do anything one wishes with impunity. The example is that of the police who remain virtually inactive....

[Trifonov] The police justify themselves by citing the laws.

[Dertliev] It is not the laws that are to be blamed. They are not saying what is most important: that they fear the political forces. When Sava Chaparov was beaten up, the police simply lacked the courage to apprehend the real

culprits, and accepted the generous gift of the crowd: two gypsies. It is thus that everyone's conscience was satisfied.

[Trifonov] As things are going, quite soon Bulgaria will have only one authority: that of the criminals. Furthermore, crime is becoming a national behavioral style.

[Dertliev] That will remain so until the police are trusted by the people. What is worse is that these processes are intensifying and even ideologized. For example, how one gets something and from where this something comes is not important. What matters is to accumulate wealth and this should be encouraged for, you see, this is purported to be economically advantageous to Bulgaria. According to some of our "theoreticians," this would start turning the wheels of production. That is how crime is being ideologized.

[Trifonov] Are these the inevitable birthmarks of democracy?

[Dertliev] Absolutely not. We simply made a mess of some things and that was the result. We did not entirely see the way weeds sprouted rapidly within our democracy. At first we developed a good idea and sincerely believed that anyone who supports it is a democrat. Now we are noticing with astonishment how many people, including leaders, do not allow other people's views and live according to the slogan "take what you want." At first, however, these people appeared entirely decent....

[Trifonov] How do you explain such changes?

[Dertliev] With the old saying that "if you want to corrupt someone, give him a woman; if this fails, give him money; and if this too fails, give him power." A number of people who, one way or another, acquired some power, either as members of institutions or parties, became incredibly degraded. At this point, however, comes the good part of democracy: the possibility of a change of leadership. I personally was mistaken in my assessment of many people and I cannot forgive myself for this.

[Trifonov] Do you consider yourself the "backbone of the Bulgarian nation?" This is one of the accusations which Elka Konstantinova has charged you with.

[Dertliev] Elka Konstantinova thinks in hyperboles and that is her error. Yes, I indeed consider my party a structure which could balance the swinging to the left and to the right. If that is what she had in mind, I agree with her.

[Trifonov] Your summations concerning social protection led to charges of populism.

[Dertliev] What does being a populist mean? The fact that we say what we think? They should rather blame us for not having said it earlier. We can calmly answer: whenever it was necessary to act as a united SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] opposition, we were able to suppress our individuality as a party. Furthermore, for

the sake of the common interests we tolerated an economic situation which conflicted with our views. The gentleman who is accusing us of populism knows this quite well.

[Trifonov] This gentleman is Ventsislav Dimitrov.

[Dertliev] The very same. Whenever he hears the word "social" he bristles.

[Trifonov] He may have serious reasons for this.

[Dertliev] The reasons are the manifestation of a sickness which is known in medicine as "anaphylaxia" or intolerance of an alien body. These gentlemen were such great servants of socialism that now they reject it with excessive sensitivity. Apparently, they will never understand that to us what is "social" neither begins nor ends with social protection. Pensions, hospitals.... Yes. However, also just payment for labor. Today questionable individuals are becoming millionaires in numbered days but there is no production. Conversely, there is blanket plunder. Shall I remind the ladies and gentlemen that, after the war, Sweden and Austria began with nothing when they created what were precisely social societies? Do they dare to claim that they will leave the unemployed without aid? What would happen if a hungry mass of 400,000 people was to appear? We would have to raise an army which would be just as strong in order to control them. Therefore, this problem is linked to the tranquillity of the country. Anyone who rejects the social context of economics and politics should be prepared to meet the hungry with weapons. Some people may have that type of courage. I do not.

[Trifonov] Nonetheless, these are intelligent people. How can they fail to understand your arguments?

[Dertliev] Whatever the case, their actions prove a lack of political and economic thinking. When one is saying that in this country there should be many rich people regardless of the price one has to pay, any claim to intelligence becomes invalid.

Incidentally, strange occurrences have been taking place recently. Those same people who, until yesterday, tried to convince me that there can be no social market economy whatsoever until the arrival of big money, most unexpectedly stated in the press that they are in favor of such an economy. Someone else loudly proclaimed that the slogans of his party were "freedom," "justice," and "solidarity." However, these are the three slogans of the Socialist International.

[Trifonov] Wonderful! Political convergence in action.

[Dertliev] This is rather political demagoguery in action.

[Trifonov] Who in parliament would you challenge to a public debate on the conflicting problems of the transition?

[Dertliev] I am looking for a flexible opponent and the most flexible of them is Gin'o Ganev. As to an intellectual opponent: that would be Chavdar Kyuranov. I would also choose a straight person, such as Dragomir Draganov. However, I would not choose a single one of the 39.

[Trifonov] Not a single one?!

[Dertliev] Not a single one.

[Trifonov] Name a real political personality in parliament.

[Dertliev] What is one to do: again Gin'o Ganev. He is indeed the typical representative of "homo politicus." If he had a charge of idealism within him he would have been priceless. I must say that this National Assembly is functioning largely thanks to his skill. Considering this confusion and these contradictions, he was indeed able to prevent total chaos at the sessions.

[Trifonov] You are not calling for meetings of the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party].

[Dertliev] Because I like dialogue. At meetings there are no dialogues. All you have to say is "down with the communists," and "in the past as well as today the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] has been a mafia,"... and you are ready. That marks the end of the entire "dialogue."

[Trifonov] What is the present and future role of the president in this political confusion?

[Dertliev] His task is difficult. In a society so greatly stratified by hatred and different interests it is difficult to play the role of umpire. On top of everything else, the group which he led is also stratified and filled with reciprocal suspicion and hatred. Whereas in the past he was able to be the rallying force of the SDS, today this is virtually impossible. Particularly when he must, as the head of state, make decisions which do not please the SDS. As to his future role, he must remain the president!

[Trifonov] Your political position is not ignored. The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] hates you because of your excessive anticommunism. The SDS hates you because of insufficient anticommunism. Meanwhile, you seem to be blossoming. What kind of games is nature playing here?

[Dertliev] Let us discuss things in order. After 100 years of struggle against the social democrats, it is very difficult to accept that your opponent was right. The BSP hates me (naturally, not all of its members do) because I represent a truth, a party. This is their right. My dark blue colleagues, in turn, do not approve of me because of my social views. This too is their right. However, they should have known that the social democrats have never denied their support of social principles. What makes me wonder is why, if they are not in favor of a social society, do they not publicly state that they are in favor of an antisocial society. Notwithstanding the fact that their

real actions are precisely of that nature. So what I do is I withdraw and I let the two forces clash one against the other and, although this displeases them, I remain intact. They expected that everything that had been said about me would give me a heart attack. This did not happen.

There is something else as well. According to some people, my suffering should have been an absolute revenge. It would have been the Archangel Michael with his bloodied knife. Now they are disappointed. I am sorry; that is not my fault. You say that I look blossoming. Look here, a person who has faced death so frequently has no reason to be pessimistic. To me every single day is a gift of destiny and I welcome it with joy. And I believe in the essential rationality of the Bulgarian people!

### **BZNS-United Leader on Opposition Goals**

91BA0968B Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian  
25 Jul 91 p 2

[Interview with Tsenko Barev on the mission of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, BZNS-United, by Mariya Aglikina; place and date not given: "Let Us Restore the Harmony of Democratic Forces"]

[Text] Talking to Tsenko Barev means experiencing the Bulgarian drama and getting a sense of the past, when human values had not been mixed in with the Red slop of an ideology which governed and, for 45 years, twisted the way of thinking and mentality of the people.

[Aglikina] Mr. Barev, could you draw the analogy between the opposition in 1945-1946 and the present situation in Bulgaria?

[Barev] Chaos is the common factor. The difference is that the previous organizations were headed by people who had a clear idea of the future. They had no illusions about what to expect. The struggle between the democratic groups and the Communists was not being waged at meetings, as is currently the case, but in the local areas and much more fiercely. There were some 300,000 Soviet troops stationed in the country. Everything went through the Soviet command. Bulgaria was an occupied country. However, it would be foolish to drag cases out of history and apply them to the present.

[Aglikina] In your view, what is the main thing that must be changed in the political features of the BZNS [Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]?

[Barev] We must fight with ourselves. We have historical obligations to our people. The BZNS does not set for itself as its main objective to rule but to help the people, to develop cooperatives, and to accomplish specific things.... Above all, we must find our own selves not only in the interests of the organization but also of us personally. We must save democracy so that the Bulgarian people may feel that they live in their own country....

[Aglikina] Beautifully put!

[Barev] This comes from my soul.... We must cleanse the hatred, which is not a constructive feeling.

[Aglikina] How do you conceive of the restructuring of political forces with a united BZNS?

[Barev] Unquestionably, a unification must take place. The position of the united BZNS is to do everything possible to restore an understanding with the democratic forces outside the BZNS. We shall draft a program and seek cooperation. The political objective is not to pull down the fence around the Communist sheep pen but the entire system.

[Aglikina] How many lists should there be in the elections?

[Barev] This must be discussed carefully. If we determine that our chances would improve with several lists, that is how we shall approach it....

[Aglikina] What is your view of the present political leaders in Bulgaria?

[Barev] Some political leaders do not realize the tragic situation to which the Bulgarian people are succumbing. The difficulties in the transition should not be borne mainly by those same people who had been crushed most violently for 45 years. The political leaders must work less for the parties and more for the people, particularly for the young. I do not want to see our wonderful young people washing dishes in the West. We need clearly determined political organizations. All the rest is words on paper....

[Aglikina] What surprised you in Bulgaria?

[Barev] The fact that I could not see a real feeling of responsibility displayed. A feeling for the state. There is constant talk about Europe. Yes, but we are not Europe! We must not forget that we are a very old country. We had literacy and national borders in the Middle Ages, but also we had the bad luck of being led by criminals. We rest on a number of cultures that are part of us. Our country would not be poor if a strong economy can be developed.

[Aglikina] How do you explain, in that case, the nihilism of the Bulgarians?

[Barev] The moral corruption and spiritual misery were introduced by the Communists. Nonetheless, I remain optimistic. They were not able to penetrate too deeply and everywhere. Everything could be quickly cleansed. The Communist crimes, however, should not be forgotten!

[Aglikina] Do you think that the Bulgarian opposition is underestimating its opponent, represented by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]?

[Barev] It neither underestimates nor overestimates it. It simply has failed accurately to assess and analyze it. We

do not have precise figures either about the victims of the Communist regime or our foreign debt. We do not know anything about economic and health balances. We are not handling a single area with accuracy. The Bulgarian people are marching in the fog....

[Aglikina] Will you tell us something about yourself?

[Barev] I have not taken anything out of this country for my own use. I did not come here to make a political career, at my age this would be.... I participated in the construction of the Court Building, the Post Office, and so on. This was followed by four years in prison in the homeland and nearly half a century in exile. I want to help my people and once again to say "no" to injustice.

### Changes in Labor Relations Analyzed

91BA0966A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian  
22 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Docent Candidate of Economic Sciences Yosif Iliev: "Changes in Relations Between Hired Worker and Employer"]

[Text] Several major economic laws passed by the VNS [Grand National Assembly], and the initiated (albeit with some delay) structural changes in the country's economy lead us to hope that the economy will become dynamized, industrial production in particular. Along with the need to develop the market structures and elements faster, we are facing the problem of making a radical change in labor relations in the country. Such a change would put on a market basis the principles governing relations between the hired worker and the employer. Such a change would make our labor legislation and practical mechanisms closer to those of the developed market economies.

The preparatory work has been done. We are expecting soon (we hope) the adoption of major changes in the Labor Code. The interest in the "philosophy" of change in labor relations and in the specific mechanisms for their organization is justified. Let us synthesize the more essential aspects in this area.

The draft documents indicate a categorical rejection of the centralized and fixed state rules governing labor relations and their past imperative-based and detailed regulation. An approach has been adopted for developing and applying in economic life a legal system of a suppletive nature. This will truly guarantee the free manifestation of the will of the workers, the trade unions and the employers in settling a wide range of problems of labor relations. The decentralized suppletive regulation on hired labor relations, consistent with the conditions of the labor market, is the most important feature of the new system and, actually, the only accurate way under the new conditions.

Another important aspect in changes in labor relations is the new concept on the correlation between labor legislation (the Labor Code) and the collective and individual

labor contract. A concept is emphasized, the observance of which could result in the successful harmonizing of two separate matters, i.e., free economic initiative applied in a social state.

In more specific terms, in this case the intent is for the law to include a minimal number of standards (requirements) governing labor activities and labor conditions in economic entities. The collective labor contract would expand and concretize them according to the specific labor conditions, without "dropping" below the legal standards. The individual labor contract will make them detailed and will make the contract even more favorable and acceptable to both sides.

The social state must see to it that the legal guarantees will not be violated by certain minimal requirements concerning labor relations. It will establish the conditions that are the minimally favorable for hired labor. Above this minimum there will be freedom of labor relations contracting. That is precisely what expresses the suppletive principle in regulating labor relations.

The structure of the collective labor contract is new. It is based on the classical formulation that a collective contract is a standard agreement between blue- and white-collar workers, represented by their trade unions, and the employers, represented by the head of the enterprise.

It will be quite difficult to balance the interests of both sides. A clash is inevitable. However, it must be made clear that the balance of interests will be "sought" and found in the various contract stipulations, which will be more favorable to the blue- and white-collar workers compared to the legal stipulations. In the absence of adequate trade union experience in this respect, the need for a profound analysis and evaluation of the overall condition and functioning of the enterprise becomes unquestionable. The purpose in contracting is to use the power of arguments and not force.

The next important feature of eventual legal guarantees is that of protecting the legal labor relationship with blue- and white-collar workers in the cases of changes of ownership and of enterprise owners. This is a problem of a social and protective nature that will find its legislative resolution in the Labor Code and in the Law on Privatization. However, it must be pointed out that protection from layoffs in changes of ownership and owners should not become absolute. Major structural changes are about to take place in industry; new commercial strategies will be developed and implemented on the basis of technological, organizational, and product innovations. The redistribution of the manpower is, to a certain extent, inevitable. In that connection, contracting requires flexibility and ability to substantiate and defend the positions of trade unions and employers and to reach mutually acceptable decisions based on an understanding of the market principle of effective employment.

Another new aspect is structuring the professional qualifications of blue- and white-collar workers entirely on a contractual basis.

We are adopting a market approach based on the free expression of the manpower that has the initiative of upgrading professional skills. In order to participate in the "competition," this initiative is contractually codified with employers. This is a prerequisite for the flexibility and purposefulness in optimizing the professional-skill structure of personnel in enterprises.

The range of problems related to the structure of wages, which is the core of labor relations, is exceptionally important. Let us briefly note that the laws governing wages will be free from detailed regulations, the viability of which has not been proven. The state intervention in such settlements is reduced to a sensible minimum, based on ensuring the social protection of workers in the state and private sectors. Scope is being provided for the contractual settlement of wages on all levels.

#### **Police Official on Money Laundering**

*91BA0968A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian  
26 Jul 91 p 3*

[Interview with Colonel Milcho Yashev, chief of Economic Police Administration, by Katya Vladimirova and Branimir Yankov; place and date not given: "Will There Be a Bulgarian Washing Machine To Launder Dirty Money?"]

[Text] In the first six months of 1991 alone, 3,004 economic crimes were committed, with damages assessed at 33,560,000 leva. The number of crimes for the entire year 1990 was 5,552, and the damages amounted to 29,237,000 leva.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Is there a danger, with such a "stalemate," for Bulgaria to be sold out piecemeal and very cheap, and that we become a washing machine for foreign dirty money?

[Yashev] The danger is real, and one of the new activities of this administration is to study the economic processes, to analyze them, and draw conclusions. The purpose is not only to include the new types of crime in the Penal Code but also to expose their mechanisms. The geographic position of Bulgaria in East Europe is similar to that of Switzerland in West Europe, and the international criminal world will try to use our hunger for foreign investments to launder its dirty money. This involves billions of dollars. That was the reason for which Switzerland passed a law on declassifying the secrecy of deposits if necessary, and a fine of \$700,000 plus three years prison term.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Do you have any specific data?

[Yashev] We are working on a number of cases but we have still not completed one, for our investigation is being hindered by many agencies, parties, and interests.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Does this involve the case of the Slunchev Den Company?

[Yashev] That is a case of party interests interlinked with foreign investments. The company claims that it is using exclusively party funds, and until we have proven the opposite we cannot say that a crime has been committed. In the case of the Viktoriya Siti Company, however, the fraud amounted to 15 million leva: People seeking work abroad were fleeced.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] Is the new structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs a hindrance or a help?

[Yashev] We intend to cooperate with anyone who would like to get to the truth in intertwined cases. Our problem is the early retirement of field workers at their most creative age—50 (and with 20 years seniority). Another hindrance is the existing legal structure, for in the case of a number of crimes no laws have been passed as yet and we cannot open a file for a number of black marketeers, newly-hatched businessmen who cheat on taxes, computer crimes involving theft of information, and other crimes committed by Bulgarian or international monopolists. The reason is the legal vacuum and our unstable market economy. Adding to this political instability and biases, this forms the chain that is tying our hands. I hope that with the joint efforts of society, reasonable politicians and, above all, newsmen, we shall be able to stop the draining of the national wealth out of the country in terms of manpower, resources, and relics. We must identify the culprits for our tremendous foreign debt and, above all, prevent criminals from assuming positions of power and concealing their dirty deals.

[SVOBODEN NAROD] What are you relying on?

[Yashev] We are the only ones who are responsible for our work. This is not only in the eyes of the law although everyone realizes that we had, have, and will continue to have difficulties in the struggle against crime, the more so since criminals are becoming increasingly powerful through their money. Furthermore, no one is safe from temptation....

### Conflicts Within Ecoglasnost Analyzed

91BA0965A Sofia KULTURA in Bulgarian 5 Jul 91 p 4

[Interview with Krasen Stanchev, chairman of the Environmental Commission in the Grand National Assembly by Albena Arnaudova; place and date not given: "Look Back Without Anger"]

[Text] Recently, when a group of deputies, including Krasen Stanchev, resigned from Ecoglasnost-Sofia, one of the present leaders of this association said: "We were finally able to see clearly."

[Arnaudova] At the very beginning of 1990 some of the people who created Ecoglasnost left this association seemingly unwilling to have anything to do with its new reincarnations. Why did you stay in it?

[Stanchev] I did not leave at that time because even before that I had pledged to achieve two objectives: to stop the building of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant and to have an environmental law passed. I had stated that I would do all I could to achieve these objectives and I could not allow myself to withdraw without meeting these moral commitments. Someone had to do this job. Some people left as a result of the founding of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. At that time I did not suspect that I would become a member of parliament and head one of its commissions.

[Arnaudova] Are you sorry that things went that far?

[Stanchev] No. My remaining in parliament gave me incredible practical experience. This is like being in jail: You learn things you never forget.

[Arnaudova] However, you left Ecoglasnost recently. Does this mean that you no longer find in that association whatever you and people like you invested in it at the very beginning, long before 10 November 1989?

[Stanchev] Obviously. Actually, such a development of Ecoglasnost-Sofia was expected. I personally anticipated it as early as December 1989. As an idea and status, Ecoglasnost is a wonderful association. It is democratic and totally open. Let us not forget that much of the specific work done by the parliament in defense of the environment was based on proposals submitted by Ecoglasnost in 1989, or else in agreement with its views on various issues. Unfortunately, however, today the practical work done by the association is quite different from its initial ideas and status.

[Arnaudova] What feeling do you get, when recent fellow sympathizers become opponents?

[Stanchev] This is not particularly pleasant. It is expected in some cases and unexpected in other. I became the target of all sorts of accusations and criticisms. What can I do? At first, after I became "important," my old friends began to adopt a servile attitude. Now I must accept the accusations of those who were until recently my colleagues.

[Arnaudova] Do you accept them? In general, how do you feel during this period in your life when your personality is so much in the public eye? The way you are being described ranges from "brilliant" to "traitor" and "red garbage."

[Stanchev] I am a teacher, for which reason in the past as well I was the target of other people's attention. However, that was in the classroom. Matters are now more different and much more difficult. I am now a public personality and the insults which I could simply scornfully ignore in the past as Krasen Stanchev I can no longer ignore.

[Arnaudova] You are by no means a typical example of the complex Bulgarian intellectual. Your restraint may be concealing quite a strong self-confidence.



[Stanchev] That is something I have never concealed. Is it bad? Had I not been certain that I stand above the average I would not have assumed such a position in this parliament, I would not have dared to run.

[Arnaudova] What do you think of the other deputies? Are they above average too?

[Stanchev] You may have expected of me to say precisely the opposite. However, the intellectual level of some deputies is quite high. This may sound paradoxical, but it is a fact. These are essentially people with tremendous abilities—philosophers, sociologists, writers, artists, scientists. The average Bulgarian deputy is much more intelligent than the average Austrian parliamentarian, for instance. The sad part is that that “mass” of deputies has no standards of political behavior.

[Arnaudova] Was that the reason why the VNS [Grand National Assembly] created a social image of itself which is much worse than that of the cabinet, let us say?

[Stanchev] Such a comparison is rather risky. Initially a cabinet works more in the shadows, without great publicity, for there the stakes are different. It is precisely the parliament that is an institution which must work in the public eye, for which reason it is the target of most of the criticism. If the people could see what the government is doing and how it is doing it, they would be shocked even worse. The stress in the cabinet is also tremendous. Furthermore, the results of the work of a cabinet are much faster and more direct, for which reason its actions are easier to understand, whereas the results of the work of a parliament are seen more in the long term or at least that is how it should be. The parliament makes laws, the implementation of which will influence and change life only after a while. That is why all the criticism that the parliament is not working the way it should is groundless. Even during periods which may have appeared fruitless to the outside observer, in fact they may have been extremely necessary.

[Arnaudova] Why? Is it because in such seemingly sterile debates political standards are acquired, of which there is so little in our parliament?

[Stanchev] There are no few standards. There simply are no standards at all. How could there be any, when no such standards were developed in the past? There simply is no stratum of political personalities in Bulgaria. Until recently, all we had was a foreign policy, while no domestic policy existed, for there was no need to have one. That is why we had no prerequisites for the natural development of such a political stratum or of the financial and economic mechanisms which would make its existence and support possible. Nor do we have them to this day. Last year we thought that a Bulgarian deputy was earning a great deal of money. However, his salary is half the minimal wage in Argentina and no more than one-third of the salary of a university teaching assistant in Kinshasa, in Zaire. Theoretically, a deputy could be bought quite easily. The average Bulgarian parliamentarian is quite inexpensive. As long as things do not

change in our country to such an extent that the existence of economically independent and free politicians has become possible, maintaining any kind of parliamentary standard will be inconceivable.

[Arnaudova] Incidentally, is this the reason why there is no Green lobby in our parliament, people who are truly, and not only verbally, involved in promoting an ecological platform?

[Stanchev] A “lobby” means people who have access to the legislative authorities, where they can influence the deputies. There are laws governing the creation of a lobby. I even had ready-made “prescriptions” for this, but I knew from the very beginning that they would not work in Bulgaria. Before the elections all parties had included some ecological stipulations in their programs. However, even then it was clear that they would not be keeping their word. A lobby is created in the presence of certain economic and social mechanisms which are still lacking in the country. We have still not reached that stage. The fact that there are so many Ecoglasnost and Green Party deputies does not mean that there is a Green lobby in the VNS. These are parliamentary groups with a wide range of democratic values. At that time, prior to the first elections, we had so many “Green” candidates because, let me be frank, we did not want to have too many SDS members in parliament without any clear values or cultural orientations.

[Arnaudova] Is there something painfully lacking in this parliament?

[Stanchev] There is no forbearance, tolerance, tactfulness, upbringing, diplomacy, restraint, and no general behavioral standards. In a word, there are no parliamentary ethics. Yet it is precisely this that would make the work of a parliament efficient and meaningful.

[Arnaudova] In your view, how many parliaments should change before such ethics become the unwritten law?

[Stanchev] Three! The speed of the change depends on when and how rapidly economics will become separated from politics and, consequently, develop a social system which will allow the existence of an independent political stratum, an elite.

[Arnaudova] Until then, will such wild mores continue to prevail in the National Assembly?

[Stanchev] Such wild mores are something entirely normal. I do not understand why everyone is so shocked by them. Actually, I do understand, but I do not share the feeling. Our parliament can simply not be any different. Tremendous hopes were focused on the parliament and when the people saw the parliament as it was, they became indignant. The parliament, however, precisely reflects what they are. It is their own choice. They criticized it because they saw themselves in it. Actually, this is not bad. Let there be a safety valve for passions. Better to have a fight in parliament than have your face

slapped on the street. The bad thing is that now everyone, the local and the central authorities and the president, will be looking for justifications for their failures in the parliament. That is bad not for me personally, but as a precedent of mistrust in the legislative power, which will inevitably be replicated as disrespect for the law and the legislative power. The same could occur with the constitution, because most of the understandable anticommunism could develop into inadmissible anticonstitutionalism.

[Arnaudova] The final variant of your draft environmental law was submitted for discussion. I assume that you know that it was the subject of rather biting remarks, for you are not a lawyer.

[Stanchev] All I can tell you is that I made a careful study of the legislation in that area as applied in other countries. I attended a course on the legislative foundations of ecological strategy and politics in the United States. Therefore, I know a great deal. However, from the very beginning, starting with 1989, I have been working with a team of young and exceptionally capable lawyers.

[Arnaudova] Have you been told that you are a layman in the field of ecology?

[Stanchev] Yes. Hundreds of times, and even to this day. However, I am a professional in my knowledge of society

which, it seems to me, is a particularly important factor from the purely legislative viewpoint.

[Arnaudova] Do you see yourself as a minister of the environment?

[Stanchev] I can fulfill such obligations but do not wish the position. Being a minister is not part of my intentions.

[Arnaudova] Does this mean that you are impatient to return to philosophy?

[Stanchev] Look here, there is no longer such a thing as pure philosophy. There is no particular difference between my "purely" philosophical work and my current political occupation. In my view, environmental protection as well is a philosophical problem. Traditionally, philosophy deals with the question of the freedom of man, and it cannot be limited by any human resources or material factors. That is why so far the freedom of man in our country was always perceived and exercised as the domination of man over nature. By the end of the 20th century the change in this concept of freedom is a matter of the survival of mankind. This becomes a purely philosophical matter. Therefore, I do not view my present work as a deviation from my overall scientific career.

### Czech Political Parties Described

91CH0795B Prague REPORTER in Czech 1 Aug 91  
pp 4-5

[Article by Lukas Marvan: "Who, How, and With Whom"]

[Text] The sensible and democratic coalitions are supposedly those made after the elections, either in the government or in the opposition. However, under the conditions of our immature democracy, when many parties and movements remind one rather of the fairy tale of the doggie and the kitty, "How They Baked the Cake," the flip-flopping of coalitions and alliances a year before the election is no anomaly. Setting aside the questions of whether this is harmful or beneficial for political stability, we ask, "What will the domestic political scene be like at the end of this year, next year, and right before the elections?" Is it not easy to answer this question? Most statements of representatives of the parties and movements in the Federal Assembly who were questioned by REPORTER actually were given in this spirit.

#### Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]

Deputy Bratinka expressed surprise at the fact that the two "K's"—Kotas (Conservative Party-Free Bloc) and Klaus (Civic Democratic Party)—had not joined together a long time ago. Eng. Kotas worked for a time as an adviser to the Federal Ministry of Finance, so he had plenty of time "to talk things over long ago" with Vaclav Klaus (in the words of the person being interviewed).

As far as eventual allies of the Civic Democratic Alliance and the future of the Czech right are concerned, there is clearly an idea that Pavel Bratinka is one of the leading representatives. "In the parliament we usually vote with the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Liberals, and the 'reasonable Moravia' faction. We are trying to look at everything from the long-term viewpoint. A solid right-wing, that is, antisocialist, party attractive to the majority of voters should be created in this land. Such a grouping cannot be monolithic, monocratic, or monomaniacal. Monomaniacal in the sense that it would concentrate only on a certain aspect of the problems in society (for example, economic reform). There must be a certain plurality of personalities and opinions here, that is, within the political currents. A party like this cannot be created from one day to the next by a hasty merger of existing parties."

I would say that is likewise a relatively accurate compilation of the problems of the current Czech right. On the Civic Movement, Pavel Bratinka remarked, in substantial agreement with the majority of others, that it is hard to pin down and "has no shape." It is not too surprising that some of those on the left who were questioned also had the same opinion. Their fear was quite obviously that their "third political horse in the troika" could be harmed by including them on the left.

Of the parties of the political groupings which directly identify with the left, Pavel Bratinka expects the creation of some kind of liberal social coalition including the CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democracy], CSS [Czechoslovak Socialist Party], Green Party, and, to a certain degree, the Agrarian Party [ZS] as well. Supposedly the regional parties will also play a greater role than has been the case up until now, which will be in keeping with developments to date and the need for decentralization. "I have no comment on Slovakia," he told me in conclusion.

#### Civic Democratic Party [ODS]

Deputy Miroslav Macek, deputy chairman of the ODS, revealed that recently his party has had discussions with a number of "smaller groupings on the right of the political spectrum." Specifically these were the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], the KDS [Christian Democratic Party], the KAN [club of Nonaligned Activists], the Conservative Party-Free Bloc [KS-SB], the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS], the Republican Union [RU], and the ROI [Romany Civic Initiative], thus with all those who belong to the right other than Miroslav Sladek. "Our coalition partners will come out in the process of getting to know each other and exchanging information. We do not want to make any premature proclamations." It is obvious that thanks to its political predominance it already has today a greater opportunity to choose its coalition partners and to put conditions on them than any other party has. It is likewise obvious that Vaclav Klaus is fully aware of this fact.

As far as Slovakia is concerned, the ODS supposedly does not see here any party with greater voter support that would be close to it. "Today the VPN [Public Against Violence] is the closest to us in its viewpoints." But Miroslav Macek right after this added, "We do not want to set up a branch in Slovakia; we are watching until a party appears with which we could establish contacts similar to the relationship of the CDU-CSU [Germany's Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union]." There is no doubt that sooner or later it will come to such a merger. Everything points to the VPN transforming into a rightist party in the foreseeable future. It will just not be so rosy with the "great voter support."

#### Liberal Democratic Party [LDS]

Emanuel Mandler, chairman: "In my opinion the ODS feels that it can get by without the other parties. At the most it would be willing to take them 'under its wing' and we understandably are not looking for that." Emanuel Mandler places his own party quite meticulously in the left center and picks out Benda's KDS as the closest potential ally. Unfortunately, I was not able to determine exactly who in our political spectrum belongs to the "center of center" and who to the "right of center."

**Christian Democratic Party [KDS]**

Chairman Vaclav Benda: "In the political spectrum there are a number of groups with which we would like to cooperate. These are, for example, the CSL [Czechoslovak People's Party], the Liberal Democratic Party, the ODS, and the ODA. However, as far as the Czechoslovak People's Party is concerned, it is possible that even despite the considerable similarity of attitudes there will be a split in the existing coalition (the KDU [Christian and Democratic Union]) and that is due to the CSL, which had itself registered at the Ministry of the Interior under the name Christian Democratic Union, which has nothing in common with the original coalition."

The Civic Movement as a whole is said to find the KDS unacceptably far to the left, even though various changes and crystallizations can still take place within it. As far as the left wing itself is concerned, one-and-a-half years ago the Social Democrats supposedly (according to Vaclav Benda) had the best chance here. It was even said that they had the opportunity of becoming the strongest democratic party in the country. "However, this was all successfully squandered. I do not dare to guess what will be created on the left now and in the future and, to speak frankly, I would also not want to prompt the competition," the chairman of the Christian Democrats said in conclusion.

**Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL]**

This grouping (by the way, like the majority of the others) includes a very practical coalition alliance, obviously coming out of its presently not very rosy situation. The secretary of the KDU group, Dr. Orel (CSL): "We see the KDU as a preelection coalition of a free type which would not exclude independent candidates. We are orienting the union somewhat crosswise within the political scene. We can also accept into it the Christian-oriented wings, local organizations, individuals, and groups. After the elections, the situation will be different. We cannot predict which partners will not be successful in the elections." In other words, put as many irons as possible into the fire and take only the properly heated ones out of the fire.

Besides the KDU, the CSL reportedly is very close to the ODA, and to the ODS on economic questions. Nobody with left-wing opinions is acceptable to them.

**Civic Movement [OH]**

Zdenek Jicinsky feels that our whole political scene is not usefully delimited. Concepts such as the left, the center, and the right are not sufficiently unambiguous. Nonetheless, "certain right-wing coalitions are already being formed now. The Civic Movement sees its place as the political center. We can have partners both on the left and on the right." This certainly does not sound bad, but there still remains the questions of whether the leftist parties will be willing to cooperate with a movement which is connected with rightist parties and vice versa. "I believe that even some parties which up until now have

not been in the parliament will change our political map," opined Zdenek Jicinsky.

**Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party [CSSD]**

"So far we have spoken just with the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Agrarian Party," says Josef Wagner, the general secretary of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. Besides those named, reportedly others whose position is close to the Social Democrats are, for example, the Civic Movement, the Green Party, and HSD-SMS [Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silesia]. However, I fear that not even an alliance with the Socialists and the Agrarians will make the CSSD a sufficiently strong democratic leftist bloc to act as a counterweight to the rightists. The situation could obviously change only through an alliance with the Communists, but this is unacceptable to all groupings for many reasons.

**Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [KSCS]**

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Deputy Zdenek Jedinak complains that the political atmosphere in relationship to the KSCS is not a good one. Thanks to it, his party is considered to be on the extreme left despite the fact that its policies "in some cases do not agree" with that position. "Our comments on the laws are often interpreted incorrectly."

Zdenek Jedinak does not foresee the creation of a broad leftist coalition (in contrast to the right), but rather there will supposedly be an identification of parts of the political parties with the same opinions in some areas. It is obvious that the Communists will continue to try to cooperate with the other leftists, at least on some points. The modification proposals of the CSSD deputies supposedly will crystalize in such a way that it will be easy to figure out their continuing policies. In the opinion of Zdenek Jedinak there will be no merger of the CSSD and the CSS.

**Public Against Violence [VPN]**

"For the time being, it is premature to speak of coalition partners. We are concerning ourselves mainly with the internal problems of the movement. We want to complete the transformation to a party by autumn," answered the chairman of the Public Against Violence [VPN] group in the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Savcinsky, in response to my question. "The only coalition partners in Slovakia who come into practical consideration for us are the KDU and the Democratic Party. As far as the Czech political scene is concerned, the majority of the members of VPN obviously lean toward the ODS and the ODA."

A significant right-wing party will thus probably appear in Slovakia in the autumn. In that republic and particularly in its eastern part, however, so far there is not a lot of talk about great sympathy for the right.

### Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]

The chairman of the KDH Ivan Simko very briefly informed REPORTER of his viewpoint for the Christian Democratic Movement. "We can consider coalitions such as would not be in conflict with the basic political goals and the election results of which would be satisfactory, for example, the current Slovak government coalition."

Since the new election law and the next election system are still not known, binding coalition agreements are mostly playing the lottery. Nonetheless, there remains only a year until the next parliamentary elections and now the basis is already being formed for what political chickens will hatch next year. The minds of the politicians are even now calculating and making up combinations at top speed. We wish them, and ourselves as well, good health.

### Short Profiles of Political Parties

#### Liberal Democratic Party

91CH0833A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
27 Jul 91 p 2

[Brief characterization of some smaller political parties not included in the AISA sociological study: "One Year After Elections and One Year Before Elections"]

[Text] Liberal Democratic Party [LDS], Emanuel Mandler, chairman.

The Liberal Democratic Party follows in the steps of the Democratic Initiative, which came into being in the autumn of 1987. LDS was registered in January 1990. In March 1990 it made an agreement with the Civic Forum [OF] and its members took part in the parliamentary elections on OF ballots. After the elections, in June 1990, LDS became independent. It has two deputies in the Federal Assembly and five deputies in the Czech National Council. In the local elections 38 deputies were elected from LDS, and another 27 party members were elected from OF ballots. The party is active on the territory of the Czech Republic.

LDS supports the economic and political transformation of our society, but it has reservations about the so-called "supremacy of the revolutionary establishment," and it will do what it can to remove its supremacy of power and increase the political activity of all citizens. LDS proposes structuring the state as a union or the independence of both republics. It looks for political allies among the Christian Democratic Party [KDS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. Recently it began negotiations also with the Association of Social Democrats.

### Conservative Party-Free Bloc

91CH0833B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
29 Jul 91 p 1

[Text] Conservative Party-Free Bloc [KS-SB], Jiri V. Kotas, chairman.

It follows in the steps of the Party for Constitutional Democracy which was registered on 15 March 1990. Prior to the parliamentary elections it created together with several rightist parties the coalition Free Bloc which received 2 percent of the votes. In July 1990 the coalition transformed itself into a party, which since March 1991 has carried the attribute "conservative." The party did not participate in the local elections because of some inconsistencies in the election law. It wants to be active within the entire federation.

The conservatives demand the maximum possible reduction of state power. They support the government's scenario of economic reform, but they consider its greatest shortcoming the postponement of the tax reform which is key for the reform as well as for the development of private entrepreneurship. They insist on a functional federation or on creating two independent states bound together by close economic ties after the Benelux model. They regard ODA and ODS as the political parties close to them.

### Czechoslovak Socialist Party

91CH0833C Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
30 Jul 91 p 1

[Text] Czechoslovak Socialist Party [CSS], Ladislav Dvorak, chairman.

CSS embraces the tradition of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, founded in 1897. After February, this party was de facto abolished and replaced by the so-called Revived Czechoslovak Socialist Party which was active within the framework of the National Front.

In the parliamentary elections CSS received 2.9 percent of the votes, in local elections 1,050 candidates were successful of whom 56 won the office of mayor, particularly in smaller towns of up to 10,000 inhabitants (Vlasim, Tyniste nad Orlici, etc.). Socialists are active on the entire territory of the federation and advocate a union structure of the state.

CSS supports the economic reform, but demands a stronger role of the state during the period of transition to a market economy. State agencies should work out a selective economic policy aimed at preventing further decline in production. One of its closest political partners is the Agrarian Party of Prof. Trnka with which CSS formed a coalition in June 1991, called Liberal Social Union. Other potential allies are Czechoslovak Social Democracy, the Greens, and the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy—Society For Moravia and Silesia.

**Agrarian Party***91CH0833D Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
31 Jul 91 p 1*

[Text] Agrarian Party [ZS], Frantisek Trnka, chairman.

The Agrarian Party was formed on 12 January 1990. In the parliamentary elections it entered with several small parties into the coalition Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside, which received 4 percent of the votes. In the local elections 1,700 candidates were elected from ZS, of whom 136 were elected mayors of some smaller towns (Slany, etc.). ZS is active on the territory of the Czech Republic and wants Czechoslovakia to be structured as a union.

ZS is aware of the need for economic reform, but asks that clear goals for farmers be established. It blames the government for its lack of farm policy that would support prospering enterprises and cut back those that are unable to compete. In June of this year ZS and the Czech Socialist Party formed a coalition called Liberal Social Union. Among parties it also considers close to it are Farmers' Political Movement, Czechoslovak Social Democracy, Greens, Movement for Self-Governing Democracy, and to some extent also Civic Movement.

**Club of Nonaligned Activists***91CH0833E Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
1 Aug 91 p 1*

[Text] Club of Nonaligned Activists [KAN], Bohdan Dvorak, chairman.

KAN was established in 1968 as the only movement that questioned the leading role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 it was suspended. It resumed its activities in spring 1990, shortly before the parliamentary elections in which its candidates were on the OF ballots. KAN took part in the local elections partly on its own, partly in a coalition with OF or other parties. About 150 candidates were elected. KAN has 10 mayors in the Czech Republic, and 60 members among representatives in the Prague Town Hall and Prague districts.

KAN is active throughout the federation; it has about 10,000 members who form local clubs. It is a distinctly rightist movement, which presses for debolshevization of society and a speedy transformation of the economy. On its initiative was formed the permanent International Conference on the Crimes of Communism.

Its closest partners are ODA, ODS, Conference of Political Prisoners, Republican Union, and Club of Democratic Right HOS.

**Movement for Czech/Slovak Accord***91CH0833F Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
2 Aug 91 p 1*

[Text] Movement for Czech/Slovak Accord [HCP], Vladimir Cech, chairman.

The movement was established in February 1990. It received 0.5 percent votes in the parliamentary elections. In the local elections seven HCP candidates were elected (five in the Czech Republic, two in Slovakia). The movement is active in the entire federation and demands a unitary state with one constitution, one government, and one parliament in which the present Chamber of Nations would be replaced by the two national councils.

HCP unconditionally supports the economic reform now under way, and its view in this case is identical with Public Against Violence [VPN]. Besides VPN, its close political partners are Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia, and in the Czech Republic ODA, KAN, LDS.

**Left Alternative***91CH0833G Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
3 Aug 91 p 1*

[Text] Left Alternative [LA], Vladimir Riha, chairman.

The Left Alternative was established in November 1989 as a political movement striving for a democratic and self-governing socialism. In the 1990 parliamentary elections its candidates were on the OF ballot. It is a pluralistic-minded movement, and various autonomous groups work within its framework.

Left Alternative has reservations about the given scenario of economic reform, and thinks that it is only one of a number of possible alternatives. It asserts that the reform diverged from the originally announced plans, and warns of falling living standard and social tensions. As a solution it proposes an economic system that would make possible a free competition of various types of ownership, including self-government and cooperative enterprises.

**Romany Civic Initiative***91CH0833H Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
5 Aug 91 p 1*

[Text] Romany Civic Initiative [ROI], Emil Scuka, chairman.

It was established in November 1989. It took part in the 1990 parliamentary elections on the OF ballot. It has two deputies in the Federal Assembly, in the Czech National Council five deputies, and in the Slovak National Council one deputy. In local elections one ROI candidate was elected mayor (in Slovakia) and several ROI candidates were elected to local governments. Recently ROI decided to choose a rightist orientation, and considers ODS its partner. The party does not want to be

built on the ethnic principle but on the civic principle, emphasizing rights and responsibilities of a Romany in the first place as a citizen. ROI supports small business, and the Alliance of Romany Private Entrepreneurs is its component. ROI is active in the entire federation and has approximately 50,000 members.

#### **Civic Democratic Alliance**

91CH0833I Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
6 Aug 91 p 1

[Text] Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], Pavel Bratinka, chairman.

Civic Democratic Alliance was established in December 1989. In the parliamentary elections its candidates were on the OF ballot. Its members are represented in both the federal and the Czech government [ministers Vladimir Dlouhy, Tomas Jezek, and Bohumil Kubat]. It gained 11 seats in the Federal Assembly, and in the Czech National Council it is represented by 10 deputies. In the local elections (also on the OF ballot) it gained 10 mayors including the mayor of Prague. The membership of ODA is about 300; this is an exclusive membership.

The ODA program, called "Road to a Free Society", contains ideas of Western political conservatism and economic liberalism.

Its closest partners are KAN, ODS, and other parties of the democratic right.

#### **Romany National Congress**

91CH0833J Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
7 Aug 91 p 1

[Text] Romany National Congress [RNK], Dr. Vladimir Olah, chairman.

Romany National Congress was established in February 1991 as an opposition to the Romany Civic Initiative. It brings together 15 social organizations and initiatives, for example, Movement of Romany Activists, Association of Romany Youth, Romany Democratic Union, Association of Olasko Romanies, Christian Democratic Association Romany Matice, etc.

Romany National Congress calls itself left center, demands that Romany nationality be anchored in the constitution, wants representation of Romanies in offices and ministries, and strives for a conceptual solution of the Romany question.

#### **Association of Social Democrats**

91CH0833K Prague LIDOVE NOVINY 25 Jul 91 p 1

[Text] Association of Social Democrats [ASD], Rudolf Battek, chairman.

The group concentrated around Rudolf Battek continued its dissent activities after November 1989, and in an effort to renew social democracy in Czechoslovakia, they joined with the group formed at the initiative of

exiled social democrats. But in the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party thus constituted, there soon occurred a serious split. Rudolf Battek's group therefore established in the spring of 1990 the Club of Social Democrats in the OF [Civic Forum], which gained five mandates for deputies in the elections.

After the division of OF (in May 1991), members of this club founded the Association of Social Democrats. Its organizational structure is composed of a network of local clubs, and membership in ASD is either full or associate. ASD deputies draft legislative initiatives for changes in the border areas. They have a very critical opinion of CSSD led by J. Horak, which they do not consider to be a modern democratic party and feel that it is discrediting the ideas of social democracy.

ASD members are sympathetic toward parties created out of the Civic Forum.

#### **National Socialist Party**

91CH0833L Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
26 Jul 91 p 1

[Text] National Socialist Party [NSS], Cestmir Cejka, chairman.

It came into being on 8 September 1990 by splitting off the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. It considers itself to be the legal and political successor of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party which was established in 1897. In local elections National Socialists received 150 mandates for deputies and 10 mayoral positions (in Teplice, Tabor, and Zatec, among others). NSS is active on the territory of the Czech Republic, and is in favor of a united federal Czechoslovakia including Prague as federal territory.

NSS supports the government's scenario of economic reform, but warns against lowering the living standard of the population which would then gravitate toward the left. The party stresses individual freedom and freedom to engage in entrepreneurship, but at the same time it wants to be the party of employees and trade unionists. NSS looks for political allies in the emerging rightist bloc of ODS, ODA, KAN, KDS, and LDS, in which it wants to stand on the left.

#### **Parties on the Right Plan Unification**

91CH0795A Prague REPORTER in Czech 1 Aug 91  
p 3

[Interview with Peter Cermak, Civic Democratic Party, and Jiri Kotas, Conservative Party-Free Bloc, by Viktor Vitek; place and date not given: "ODS Plus Free Bloc: The Goal Is a Unified Right Party"]

[Text] Joint announcements by the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Conservative Party-Free Bloc [KS-SB] last week give notice of the merger prepared for the two former rivals. Politics, like marriage, joins together

partners (sometimes surprising ones) who usually supplement each other functionally in both body and spirit. We therefore turned to Deputy Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party Peter Cermak and Chairman of the Conservative Party-Free Bloc Jiri Kotas with several questions.

[Vitek] Is the agreement between your parties the beginning of a new era of the right or a marriage of convenience before the upcoming elections of 1992?

[Kotas] We do not want unnecessary confrontation and a power struggle with the ODS. We want to set up an alliance which will last for decades and centuries, not to work out pacts for the next 12 months.

[Cermak] We base this on the mandate of the ODS Constitutional Congress which tasks us with being an integrating element for political parties of the right. Any defeat of the right and victory of the left in the 1992 elections would mean a national catastrophe and a historical tragedy.

[Vitek] Have you then already overcome all your mutual reservations?

[Kotas] The differences between our parties have always belonged in the realm of a plurality of opinions and intraparty discussions, rather than justifying the existence of two independent parties. It would be illogical and unjustifiable historically if our parties did not find a common voice and did not go into the parliamentary elections of 1992 together.

We criticized the ODS more for the mechanism of its political discussions than for the content of its policies itself. On the other hand, the attempt to outshout opponents predominated in the former OF [Civic Forum] over respect for their opinions. As far as the membership base is concerned, from that viewpoint the OF legacy is sometimes harmful for the Civic Democratic Party.

[Cermak] The election campaign of 1990 was, to put it simply, a question of being for the Communists or not and from this position the OF political fight was conducted along with the Free Bloc and the other small parties of the right-wing political spectrum.

After the Oloumoc constitutional congress of the ODS we were criticized by Mr. Kotas in REPORTER for the allegedly undemocratic method of electing Vaclav Klaus as head of the party. This oversight, when a member of the proposal commission proposed to the congress that voting be public for reasons of time pressures, was as surprising for me as for any independent observer. Naturally a secret election of the party chairman had been prepared.

We likewise cannot decide the question of merging our parties for our members. The Free Bloc will submit the results of the agreement with the Conservative Party for approval by the congress of the Civic Democratic Party.

[Vitek] Where are the juncture points for the ODS and the Conservative Party-Free Bloc and where, on the other hand, are there still differences between the two parties?

[Kotas] Both political parties are inspired by modern Western conservatism with which we are familiar from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain of the 1980's. The difference is in the people with whom they work and from where the parties came. ODS developed as part of the fermentation of opinions in Civic Forum and bears in itself the seal of the "opportunism" of many former members of the OF. Among the members of our party, on the other hand, a conservative political persuasion has predominated since the very beginning.

[Cermak] Not only the politicians on the right, but also the Communists today support a market economy. We are in accord with the Conservative Party-Free Bloc both as regards the final goals and the methods of economic transformation as well. We are sticking with what has proven itself in the world and, in contrast to Mr. Komarek or Mr. Svitak, we are not looking for a third way.

I see the differences between our two parties rather in the everyday policies. Tens of thousands of people are joining the ODS with the goal of supporting the political party which has an anti-Communist platform. By their membership they express a certain view of the world and support for our political program, but I would not call it "opportunism."

[Vitek] How do you evaluate the outlook for future cooperative action with other parties of the right?

[Cermak] A probable partner for us would be the Civic Democratic Alliance, the ODA. In many areas we are capable of agreeing very well, especially as far as cooperation in the Czech National Council is concerned. On the other hand, the actual results of discussions with the ODA leadership have not been what we had imagined.

[Kotas] If there is not an integration of the Free Bloc, the ODS, and the ODA, it would be a very bad indication of the status of the right in this country. Another question is how the political leaders of these groups work things out among themselves.

[Cermak] Today a number of political parties identify themselves with the right and it would be irresponsible if there were no discussions between them and the ODS. The majority of those parties, however, do not have any chance of becoming mass political parties; the situation is further complicated by the high personal ambitions of their leaderships.

[Kotlas] The right-wing parties outside the government are not of any importance today. The capable people who were there at the birth of those parties can find spots for themselves in a large conservative party. It is in no case necessary to negotiate with all these parties as partners at the level of the party leaderships.



[Vitek] What are the goals of your parties in the period before they are merged?

[Kotas] We want to continue to create a highly qualified team of people oriented toward the right within the Free Bloc. We also want to make our program more precise as one of the foundation stones of our joint program.

[Cermak] We want to begin to train people politically who will be our future candidates for deputies and to begin to train managers for the administration of the state which we will need after the 1992 elections. Political support for economic reform is also absolutely essential. We have information that some ministers, members of the Civic Movement, are travelling around the okreses and letting it be known that they are preparing to come out with an antireform program in the fall of 1991, a kind of Czechoslovak version of perestroika. We also need to have it made clear with whom we will go into the elections of 1992 and we would like to prepare for a respectable autumn congress of the ODS.

[Vitek] Thank you for the interview.

#### **Additional Obstacles Seen in Federation's Way**

91CH0845A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech  
7 Aug 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Jana Bendova: "Untransferable Experiences"]

[Text] When a couple is parting company, it is superfluous to argue about what they have gone through together and what lies before them. After all, experiences are nontransferable. It seems similarly unnecessary to constantly write about the common fates of the Czechs and the Slovaks, the moving November days and the dangers lying in ambush waiting for the independent republics.

I have a strong relationship with Slovakia and that is also why I did not take the hissing voices of the politicians, predicting that the day on which the federation would disintegrate would occur in one or another year, too seriously. The "life span" of politicians is limited. However, today, I am afraid. The reason is the deepening difference in the views regarding the path to be taken toward economic prosperity in both republics. In the more pragmatic Bohemia, which had already gone through its "illness" of national rebirth, the most recent statistics indicate that political preferences are more stable. The polls indicate that even if the voters are not sufficiently able to tell the difference between the individual parties, the general orientation toward a nationalist element is extremely weak and a view of the economic reform or its author is being preferred. On the other hand, Slovakia feels very strongly (and adores!) the nationalities question and, thanks to the accumulation of circumstances (historical, geographic, and currently also social), supports the more leftist-oriented parties and politicians. Even though the positions of the voters in the Slovak Republic are quite changeable and although

much can change by the time the elections are held, the basic dispute—Bohemia and Moravia to the right, Slovakia to the left—will, in all likelihood, remain and will be reflected in the new governments and parliaments. And, as they say in the country, when one responds to the command haw and the other to the command gee....

Then, in my opinion, the tired wheels of the federation will definitely get stuck. What is to be done? The referendum will clearly only confirm that which we generally know today—the majority of the people long to live in a common state. But if each of them visualizes the federation in a different way, if each of them feels differently, has different needs?! The tension between Prague and Bratislava is constantly growing. I am afraid that Moric's fateful statement that "we must part company in order to understand that we belong together" may be fulfilled. Czechoslovak television has begun the pre-election introductions of the various parties. We are monitoring our politicians quite carefully, but let us think for ourselves. As is known, experiences are not transferable....

#### **Moral Values Preferred to Nationalism**

91CH0824A Prague LISTY in Czech No 3 1991 p 9

[Article by Erazim Kohak: "Main Issue Is Not the Common State"]

[Text] When I look at our present relations between Czechs and Slovaks from a philosophical perspective, I do not see the most basic issue in whether we want to jointly build a common state or live in two independent states, but rather the question of how we want to perceive our Slovak or Czech nationality and statehood, whether in ethical or ethnic terms.

Of course the Czechoslovak Republic is at issue too. It has a name in the world. It reminds us of Stefanik and Masaryk, of a time when this republic was an island of freedom and humanism and a refuge of all those persecuted in the flood of German nationalism and anti-Semitism. It reminds us of Slovak and Czech airmen over England, or more recently of the Bratislava meeting, candles against hydro-projects, two years ago also Havel's coming forward, idea against totalitarianism. But this very Czechoslovak Republic of Masaryk would betray its legacy were it to become the prison of either of its nations. Precisely as a Czech devoted to the ideal of Masaryk's Czechoslovak Republic I cannot and will not deny the Slovak nation its right to independence.

Yet philosophically it seems to me more of the essence how we will perceive our Slovak or Czech nationality and statehood, whether in two states or one. Within the Czech nation lives a dual perception of national identity. One is ethical. This was expressed for instance by Masaryk and Radl. To them Czech national consciousness was open, oriented toward the world and humanitarian. To them the Czech nation's ideals were intertwined with the ideals of democracy, respect for man, love of one's nation and openness toward other nations.

It is not a fearful and militant Czech national consciousness but rather a naturally self-confident and generous one. It was this Czech self-perception that Masaryk promoted when in the disputes over the manuscripts he pitted Czech allegiance to the truth against Czech chauvinism, or when during the Hilsner affairs he pressed for a Czech commitment to human rights against Czech anti-Semitism.

But within the Czech nation lives also another notion of Czech consciousness, ethnic or nationalistic. This bases its idea of the Czech nation on defensive chauvinism, on Czech xenophobia and Czech anti-Semitism. This is the inward-looking, soured Czech nationalism which came to the fore between Munich on 15 March 1939, at the time of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, an artifact pasted together from two amputated national mini-states. They are best described in Vaclav Cerny's "The Czech Crown's Tears" [Plac koruny ceske]: an inward-looking national chauvinism supplanting both freedom and humanism.

This dual perception of national identity, humanistic and nationalist, can be found in all nations. We were given an instructive example of this by the German national which can derive its national identity from either Lessing's or Goethe's ethical patriotism or the ethnic nationalism of the "National Socialists."

It seems to me that similarly as for the German nation the basic question for the Czech and Slovak nation too is whether they want to view their nationality and statehood in ethical or ethnic terms, in humanistic or nationalist categories—regardless of whether living in an exclusively national or common multinational state.

Both are possible. The Slovak state during wartime displayed many attributes of intolerant nationalism—chauvinism, intolerance, and of course anti-Semitism. The Kadar and Klos movie "Shop on Main Street" is worth seeing. But the very same Slovak state chose for its anthem an apotheosis of humanitarian ideals: "Who fights for truth in holy sacrifice, who dedicates life to humanity's rights, who sheds a tear for the injustice of the miserable, he is for whom glory will ring in my song...." Here I feel addressed by the greatness of a humanitarian, free Slovak self-expression.

And this, I think, is the main issue. What perception of the nation and state will prevail among Czechs—the ethical, humanistic one, or the ethnic, nationalistic? Masaryk's or Moravec's? What concept of the nation and state will the Slovak nation choose, the humanistic professed by the anthem of the former Slovak state, or the nationalistic "Up the Slovaks!" version? Stefanik's or Mach's?

If both our nations opt for the ethnic [as published], humanitarian concept, we will be able to build either two free independent states or one common federal state of two free nations, and it will make no difference. Personally I would prefer a common state, both because I respect Slovakia and because a common state with its

multiformity helps to hold inward-looking national chauvinism in check. But one way or the other we will live as free nations in a free state.

But should an ethnic, nationalistic concept prevail in our nations, it could give rise to two inward-looking nationalistic ministates or an ill-tempered concoction of two such ministates, and again it will make no difference. Whether common or separate, it will not be a free state. In that case I would personally prefer separation. Stefanik and Masaryk's ideal, the legacy of the Czecho-slovak Republic they entrusted to our hands, does not deserve having the world connect their name with petty nationalism.

### Czech Actor Defines His Nation's Identity

91CH0845B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
8 Aug 91 p 8

[Article by Milan Sebek, member of the National Theater: "The Merits of the Czech State"]

[Text] At the beginning, let us recall that the Czech nation did not receive the gift of its state, national, language, cultural, as well as political identity from anyone and could not even borrow it. On the contrary. It was forced, over a course of those few thousand years, to fight for it in a hard fight, without help and in the face of all adversity, it had to create it and defend it. In the final analysis, all of today's so-called Central European nations stood on the same starting line at that time with the Czech nation, they had similar opportunities as well as disadvantages and things were mostly up to them themselves as to how far they have come to this day as a result of their own efforts. In the midst of the German ocean, without the protection or assistance of some kind of stronger "uncle," it was not exactly easy to not only keep, but specifically profile the European level of one's language, spiritual culture, art, education, and civilization. The Czech nation also did many a positive thing for Europe as a result. This statement is not a manifestation of pride nor chauvinism nor nationalism; we are obligated to make this summation with honor for the important spiritual and material legacy of our outstanding ancestors.

It is also high time for us to realize some significant historical connections.

If it were not for Prague and the historical prestige of the Czech medieval state, we could most likely not speak today of any kind of Slovak or "Moravian" nation. The historical era of the so-called Greater Moravian Tribal Union, which did not even last an entire century, was physically and culturally crushed into dust by the Magyars, so that it could not have, and did not have, any further significance over the next centuries in the constitutional or ethnic sense, apart from a cultural spiritual legacy which was again mainly preserved as a result of the care exercised by the Prague-based followers of Premysl. The Slovaks would surely have been Magyarized and it was only the influence of the developed

Czech state and its spiritual culture and language that helped them keep a feeling of national identity in the proximity of a relative. After all, the Slovak language was constituted as a language primarily under the influence of medieval Czech Bible language. Moravia received its state identity from the Premysl overlords from Prague after they suddenly liberated it from the Magyar yoke and annexed Moravia as a part of the Czech Crown Lands—certainly to its benefit.

Were it not for the giant cultural and political upswing of the Czech national rebirth of the 18th and 19th centuries, the center of which was again in Prague and which was, of course, substantially shared in by two great Moravians (Palacky and Masaryk), and if it were not for the considerable economic maturity of Bohemia, it would not have been possible for us, following the fall of the Hapsburg Empire, to so rapidly and relatively successfully join the ranks of Europe (including Slovakia) and to be one of the most successful economic and political states.

After a 50-year pause, punctuated by two monstrous dictatorships, actually already during the course of the second dictatorship, it must be said that if it were not for the ideological and ethical pressure exerted by the Czech intelligentsia, primarily in Prague, there would not have even been an attempt at the Prague Spring of 1968 when, for the first time, it was possible to somewhat disrupt the breastplate of totality. And finally, if it were not for the ideological strength, the mental readiness, and the ethical level of the Czech educational community in Prague, headed by the students, it would not have been possible to definitively breach this totalitarian shell.

Nations, which have long since worked out and constituted their identities, for the most part speak of it modestly, calmly, and quietly. Nations which do not as yet feel that they have fully constituted their identity should not be clamoring about it and burden and hold back others with this clamoring, but should quietly and laboriously be shaping it every day in all areas of life and should quietly learn wherever this is possible. To the extent to which the Slovaks are looking for an actual culprit who prevented them from forming and asserting their identity, then history provides them with a clear response, indicating that this was mainly the Hungarian state, followed by 40 years of communist dictatorship.

One of the important symptoms of the identity of the Czech nation undoubtedly involves the ethical principles of Master Jan Hus, his predecessors and his successors in the Czech reformation, who understood the religious and human ethics more or less already from a higher viewpoint of world citizenship and of mutual interpopular tolerance. See the well-known Hus statement: "Better a good German than a bad Czech!" The Czech state at the end of the 15th century, under the rule of King George of Podebrady was, without a doubt, one of the developed states of Europe at the time, precisely in this sense. The humanistic direction then continued not only during the Czech reformation (Komensky), but even, in its way,

also in the Czech Catholic erudition in the post-Bila Hora [the Battle of White Mountain] era and made the transition to the ethical sense of the Czech national rebirth, when it was expressed by the idea that our rebirth intends to contribute its talent to the enrichment of the general ethical and esthetic values of culture in Europe and in the world. I believe that the Czech culture and art of the last century also proved able to do so. The consequence of this education was an emotional nationalism or chauvinism, which was relatively foreign to the Czech environment and which was always more in the nature of marginal manifestations here. The Czech environment which itself experienced external opposition, for the most part, was little inclined to violate anyone else or to occupy them, but was, on the whole, considerably tolerant toward other ethnic groupings, whether we begin deep in the Middle Ages with the Jews and then even the Germans. The democratic Czechoslovakia between world wars willingly afforded asylum to refugees from all surrounding militant regimes, beginning with the Nazi regime in Germany, the Bolshevik regime in Russia, all the way through the semifascist regimes in Poland and in Hungary. The overall high-quality democracy of the first republic also had its roots in the humanistic traditions of the Czech reformation.

#### **Kubat's Concept of Agriculture Supported**

*91CH0846A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
8 Aug 91 p 8*

[Article by Jan Zeman: "The Ecology Needs Kubat"]

[Text] To ecologists, it is clear that agriculture as the basis for ecology can be successful only if managed in accordance with the rules of nature and free market relationships, not violated by central direction, subsidies, and support payments. It is primarily independent private farmers who are capable of operating in this manner. Ecological principles were always close to them and their survival depended on them.

The effectivity of agriculture lies in the fact as to how much more energy is represented by available biomass produced by the farmer than is consumed by the farmer for its production. Today, it is primarily also important to note how much energy was of fossil origin—in other words, stemming from finite resources (in addition to petroleum, these include industrial fertilizers, pesticides, as well as utilized equipment). Thus, even if an agricultural enterprise produces a large quantity of biomass, but consumes more energy in this production than this biomass represents, this is understandably unproductive—it is "Turkish economics."

The export of millions of tonnes of grain will be another of the supernumerary examples of a Turkish economy. To produce this grain, we imported quantities of potash, phosphorus, and, primarily, petroleum. Large quantities of energy are also required by our production of nitrogenous fertilizers. One kilogram of nitrogen requires two liters of petroleum to produce it. All of this energy is

exported with our grain (and low world prices of wheat are already half of what they were last year).

Thus far, we are continuing to import, at great expense, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of protein concentrates for the production of fodder. Our agriculture produces disproportionately more carbohydrates as a result of its plant production than it does proteins, which would facilitate the production of efficient fodders without having to import proteins. Our agricultural ancestors produced alcohol from surplus dextrine, even in their own cooperative distilleries.

In our country, grain occupies more than 50 percent of all arable land. To reduce this area to 40 percent would mean leaving virtually half a million hectares for, say, perennial fodder crops. This would mean the immediate reduction of land erosion, reduced consumption of petroleum, and increased production of necessary proteins. The land in these areas would then be richer, on an average, by hundreds of millions of kilograms of nitrogen, which nature would provide herself to benefit follow-on crops. This represents a savings of 200 million liters of petroleum.

Today, we have the opportunity for people to realize that the fertile countryside is full of greenery, cold springs of pure water, full of living frogs, bumblebees, and all organisms; if people do not get in its way, the countryside will, itself, create a constantly growing amount of biomass from solar energy and from the elements of the environment, it will clean the water by itself, it will expand and enrich life.

There are no surpluses in agricultural production. To the extent to which there is talk of food surpluses, this is a

consequence of violating natural market relationships. A Turkish economy (and may Turkey forgive me this appellation) survives everywhere in the world for the present, otherwise the very words ecology and economy would be synonyms. The quantity of biomass which nature produces on a daily basis represents a daily contribution of solar energy to the world.

And the concept of Docent Trnka is simple and easy: "Give me money and I shall assure the farmers a peaceful and contented life." After all, farmers the world over receive subsidies.

The concept of Minister Kubat is extremely complex and demanding: He would create such conditions in the countryside that people could, would wish to, and would know how to successfully farm, so that they could use their own experiences and findings to seek out new alternatives on how to help nature in their farming activities.

At one time, our farmers used to export even the highest-quality seed stock for clovers, grasses, sugar beet, potatoes (in addition to the traditional hops, malt, and sugar), as well as peak-quality foodstuffs very efficiently as a result of utilizing natural conditions, experiences, knowledge, and honesty as proof of the ethical nature, the cleverness, and the altruism of plant breeders. As a result of central control, these characteristics evaporated and that is why a thorough and careful working out of a concept requires much effort and time. It is highly purposeful to create broad room for farmers for the development of their own structures. For the creation of their own cooperative water projects, electric power plants, and gasworks, for the constantly more efficient production of biomass, humus, and arable land.

### **Kupa for Shrinking State's Role in Privatization**

91CH0777F Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 23 Jul 91 p 3

[MTI report: "Kupa Wants To Limit the State Property Agency's Competence, According to the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG"]

[Text] (MTI) Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa wants to considerably simplify privatization procedures in Hungary. He intends to limit the competence of the State Property Agency while giving enterprise directors and enterprise councils more authority, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG reported in its Monday issue, on the basis of an interview with the Hungarian finance minister. The paper has learned that Hungary would be seeking two more loans of DM1.0 billion each from Germany. According to Kupa's plans, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG reported, Hungary's State Property Agency would be used for the reprivatization of only a limited number of enterprises, the ones in which the government wants to retain 51-percent state or Hungarian ownership. In the case of all other plants, managements would be able to agree with domestic or foreign partners, free of government interference. The only condition is that an independent appraiser agency would have to be included in determining the value of the assets. The Frankfurt paper called the finance minister "the new strongman in the Antall cabinet." According to Kupa's ideas, Hungary must serve as the neighboring countries' model of reform. To stabilize the processes that have already started and to implement its privatization program, Hungary needs substantial financial assistance from the West, wrote the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG. In that context it reported that Hungary would like to obtain two new loans of DM1.0 billion each from Germany.

### **Smallholders' New Role Seen 'Left of MDF'**

91CH0777D Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 25 Jul 91 p 5

[Interview with sociologist Csaba Varga, the Smallholders' ideologist, by Zsuzsa Szepe; place and date not given: "Smallholders Left of the Hungarian Democratic Forum? Torgyan Is Not Fumbling His Role"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Will the Independent Smallholders Party transform itself? Will it shift to the right, as Jozsef Torgyan has indicated? Or will it occupy a place left of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], as sociologist Csaba Varga, the party president's chief adviser and the party's ideologist, claims? After Jozsef Torgyan's inaugural address as party president, rumors were rife regarding the identity of the persons with whom he was holding talks and about whom he would like to gain as his adviser. But it is a fact that Csaba Varga, a former leader

of the [Hungarian] People's Party and president of the Civic Movement for the Republic, has already joined the Smallholders.

[Szepe] Who invited you to the Smallholders? What do you like about the Smallholders Party?

[Varga] A few associates and I carefully examined our situation and what we would like to represent in the future. Our team comprised friends and experts, not just former members of the [Hungarian] People's Party, but also members of what by then were parliamentary parties. We established that the change of regimes was not taking place the way we as writers or sociologists had imagined earlier. I knew already at the time of the Opposition Roundtable talks what pain we could expect in conjunction with the change of regimes. In the 1980's, I had been in charge of the so-called Experiment Along the Sio. In four villages in the northeastern corner of Somogy County we had carried out a change of regimes on a pilot scale. The general public did not learn about this experiment, yet it had consequences which, if properly evaluated, would have made the events of the past year more readily understandable. Accordingly, there are three problems we have to face. First, that we have neglected to analyze the past 40 years. Second, that what we want is not evident. And third, that the forced trajectories of society and of the economy are basically hampering the realization of the new system's concept. Therefore we concluded that yet another change of regimes would be necessary. The new program of the Smallholders Party offers new possibilities.

[Szepe] Did not Csaba Varga and his associates happen to elaborate that program?

[Varga] I was not yet an adviser to the party at the time, but I was able to influence the shaping of the program.

[Szepe] The Smallholders Party is promising to consult experts.

[Varga] A new concept of the party's organization and operation was completed last week. Ten departments will be formed at the party's headquarters, and there will be about seven to 10 committees of experts to assist the departments in their work. Experts are now being invited to these committees, and the list of the 50 to 70 experts whom the party has successfully won over will be made public in August. Who is on the list is no secret, but we have agreed to release all the names at the same time.

[Szepe] Will there be democracy under the new organizational structure?

[Varga] There has been nothing to reorganize in that respect. With anarchy, on the other hand, it would not be possible to make the Smallholders the country's strongest party by 1993. The new organizational structure does not mean that the departments will be "stealing" their decisions from the committees. Thorough analysis will be indispensable before any decision is reached. Among our experts we do not have any who had played

an important role under the previous regime. Andras Kocsis, the president and chief executive of Kockazat Rt [Risk Corporation], is the only one who ever had been a member of the apparatus.

[Szep] What is his function?

[Varga] He is an economic expert, but not a member of the party. We are utilizing his intellect and know-how.

[Szep] What is a plutocrat doing among Smallholders?

[Varga] This party is the party of proprietors. Therefore the plutocrats have decided to bring their fundamental economic interests "onto the political stage." In politics we are openly undertaking to represent the economy's interests. But we want to be the party of not just plutocrats. We are thinking in terms of three kinds of property: economic, political, and intellectual-communications property. At present, for instance, we are collaborating intensively with Hungarian inventors, giving them an opportunity to use their knowledge and inventiveness also on our behalf.

[Szep] In his campaign speech Jozsef Torgyan declared that the Smallholders Party is also the party of blue-collar workers, and not just of proprietors. Are you not afraid that anyone who grabs much tends to hold little?

[Varga] We are not representing wage earners.

[Szep] At the latest meeting of the party's expanded national committee, Jozsef Targyan was seen in intimate conversation with Sandor Racz, who had been the chairman of the Greater Budapest Workers Councils in 1956 and ran on the Smallholders ticket in the local elections.

[Varga] Sandor Racz is not a member of the Smallholders Party.

[Szep] Jozsef Antall recently said that the Smallholders Party has strayed far from its historical past.

[Varga] An impartial expert will tell you that in the autumn of 1989 the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] became a major party by riding the wave of its extreme antibolshevik stand. The MDF followed suit in the spring of 1990 and won the more votes in the second round. Now it appears that certain circles within the MDF are resorting once again to this proven strategy. Which could bring about the peculiar situation that, briefly or for a longer period of time, the MDF might shift to the right of the Smallholders Party.

[Szep] The Smallholders Party, then, will not be shifting to the right, the way Jozsef Torgyan said it would?

[Varga] As a civic conservative party, the Smallholders Party will still remain permanently a center-right party. For strategic or tactical reasons, however, some other party could now become more right-wing than Torgyan has been up to now. The party's historical traditions rule out extremism. The party's present program offers no

indication of extremism, and neither does the party's activity during the past month reflect any extremism. Therefore the prime minister's criticism is off the mark.

[Szep] Does Jozsef Torgyan's conversion not indicate that it has been a means serving certain interests, rather than an end?

[Varga] Such rumors are indeed rife. But whoever believes them is underestimating the party's president. No politician will relinquish his autonomy for the sake of economic interests. An independent politician speaks differently than when he is expressing an opinion as party president. Torgyan is not fumbling his role. He knows what to say when.

### Law on Private Legal Practice Liberalized

91CH0777C Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
26 Jul 91 p 3

[Report by A.S.: "Attorneys May Decide Whether To Pursue Private Practice"]

[Text] A new law finally enacted after a relatively long delay makes it the duty of the attorney to help assert his client's rights, regardless of whether the attorney has been retained by the client or appointed to aid him. As Dr. Jenő Horváth, the chairman of the National Council of Lawyers, said at a press conference held on Thursday, a lawyer is an expert who helps protect the citizen's interests.

The law enacted by parliament and published in the 3 July issue of MAGYAR KOZLONY amends Decree No. 4/1983 in a way that meets the requirements of a rule-of-law state. It would have been premature to enact a comprehensive and uniform code for attorneys, because the possible modes of legal representation laid down in statutory regulations still differ. The difference is due to the fact that—in accordance with the previous social and economic system's legal thinking—state enterprises, cooperatives, other forms of business association, and mass organizations have been able to employ in-house legal counselors. That is in contrast with the system of self-employed attorneys who represent clients on a case-by-case basis. Which means that an attorney may not be employed. Therefore it will be possible to adopt a uniform code for attorneys once the final forms of legal representation evolve in the course of privatization.

According to the amended law, anyone who meets the requirements—Hungarian citizenship, compulsory malpractice insurance, no criminal record, bar examination, and suitable office premises to receive clients—is entitled, by virtue of his civic right, to be admitted to the bar.

It is common knowledge that membership of a lawyers' cooperative was compulsory for attorneys if they wished to practice law. That was because the Ministry of Justice determined the legal profession's maximum size, and this restriction led to very widespread patronage.

The Law on Attorneys, which will become effective on 1 October, abolishes lawyers' cooperatives for good. They will be replaced by law offices. Attorneys will be free to decide whether to practice law alone or to continue practicing within the framework of professional corporations. The minister of justice will oversee only the legality of the legal profession's activity. The new law can be expected to swell significantly the legal profession's ranks.

Because the population's financial situation could worsen further, and more attorneys will probably have to be assigned to represent suspects or defendants in criminal cases, NEPSZAVA inquired who would pay the fees for such legal aid in the future.

The answer was that in Budapest the authorities concerned and the Bar Association have come to an agreement under which the authorities will send their orders for legal aid to the Bar Association, which will pass them on to law offices. And the state will continue to pay the fees for legal aid.

The private law offices will probably be charging higher fees than at present. Officers of the bar associations, too, believe that attorneys' fees will be higher, because the present fees were set years ago and have become completely outdated since then. But it is also possible that some offices will charge reasonable lower fees, in order to build up their practice.

#### **Government Ministers' Incomes Partly Tax Exempt**

*91CH0777A Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
26 Jul 91 p 1*

[Report by saman: "Ministerial Wallets Getting Fatter Tax-Free"]

[Text] From July on, government ministers will be able to claim a tax-free expense allowance equal to 50 percent of their salary, but for state secretaries the expense allowance will be only 30 percent of their salary. A decree to that effect appeared in the No. 78 issue of MAGYAR KOZLONY.

A high-ranking specialist in state administration, who did not wish to be identified, told our reporter: "I regard this as a dishonest way of augmenting incomes. It deprives of pay increases all those civil servants in state administration and the deputies of the National Assembly, whose monthly pay is fixed as a certain percentage of ministerial salaries. And I think it is outright reprehensible that, at a time when the government wants to curtail or abolish tax benefits, it itself is setting a bad example by showing how to seek and find loopholes."

Commenting on the decree, Ivan Peto, the leader of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] caucus, told our reporter that he found the idea of having to raise ministerial salaries acceptable—after all, good experts

would not accept the position if they were not paid enough—but this was not the way to do it. The government would have done better to devise a comprehensive system of remuneration applicable to the entire state administration. To raise merely the expense allowances necessarily creates suspicion that the rise in incomes has been limited to a narrow circle.

At the same time, the caucus leader took exception to a comment that Andras Jakab, a government chief counselor, made regarding the cost allowance, in an interview he gave yesterday. Jakab noted that setting their own salaries had been the first thing that also the National Assembly's deputies had done.

"There have always been salaries for ministers, but not for deputies. Because serving as a deputy had not been a principal occupation for the previous parliament's members. That is why the deputies' salaries had to be set when the new National Assembly convened, and not because the deputies were money grubbers," Ivan Peto declared.

#### **Signature Campaign Against Compensation Law**

*91CH0777E Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 20 Jul 91 p 4*

[Interview with Laszlo Kemeny, cochairman of the Council for the Reconciliation of Social Interests, by S.P.; place and date not given: "Council Collecting Signatures; Laszlo Kemeny Firmly Opposed to Compensation Law"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] The 43 organizations that belong to the TET [Council for the Reconciliation of Social Interests] are continuing their signature-gathering drive for a referendum to rescind the Compensation Law. The National Council of the Unemployed, the Leftist Lawyers' Forum, and, as an observer, the Leftist Youth Association are supporting the drive. We interviewed Laszlo Kemeny, one of the cochairmen of the Council for the Reconciliation of Social Interests.

[S.P.] How many signatures have been collected so far?

[Kemeny] I am unable to give you exact figures as yet. We will start counting signatures only at the beginning of next week. After the count, we will present the signatures to the press. I would like to emphasize that we do not regard a referendum as an aim in itself. Instead, we believe that the Compensation Law's implementation would cost more than what the Bos [Gebcikovo]-Nagymaros project would have cost, which is more than what the country could afford. We hope that we have called attention in due time to the need of rescinding the Compensation Law.

[S.P.] It is common knowledge that you at one time were vice chancellor of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist

Workers' Party] Political College. How much credibility do you have, or to what extent does your past affect the signature-gathering drive?

[Kemeny] In this country the old experts have been depicted as lacking credibility. The present power elite is playing with a suitcase that has a false bottom. The top of the suitcase says that anyone who held some position under the previous regime was corrupt, a cheat, a crook, and a liar. That bunch, in other words, has to go. But packed in the bottom of the suitcase is that the previous regime's sense of social justice must be exorcised from the minds of citizens. Morally I consider myself a credible person because I did not steal or lie and was not out to get anyone. The present power elite probably does not consider me credible in a political sense. But then I do not want to appear credible to those who once again are creating poverty in this country, where men are beginning to prey like wolves on their fellowmen. I do not agree with the Christian regime of the Christian middle class. I am thinking in terms of modernization that cannot claim wage earners and salaried employees as its victims.

[S.P.] Are you now a member of any political party?

[Kemeny] No, I did not join any political party after the dissolution of the MSZMP. Moreover, I did not take part in the skirmishes here at home, having been on an extended stay abroad.

[S.P.] Where were you?

[Kemeny] I was in Moscow as a visiting professor at the Academy of Social Sciences. I wrote a book analyzing the dilemmas of *perestroika* from the viewpoint of strategy.

### **'Thousands' of Chinese Settling in Budapest**

91CH0777B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian  
26 Jul 91 p 2

[AFP report: "Chinatown in Budapest?"]

[Text] (AFP) The first "Chinatown" in East Europe could soon arise in Budapest. Thousands of Chinese have been arriving there lately, with the firm intention of starting businesses in Hungary.

Since April of this year, engineers, professors, businessmen, skilled workers, and cooks have been arriving

in Budapest from the People's Republic of China, to explore the Hungarian capital for themselves. At Budapest Bank's main entrance there is already a sign in Chinese to inform customers about the office hours of the windows at which foreign-exchange accounts can be opened, because the Chinese, who have come to Budapest by taking advantage of the waiver of visa requirements, a holdover from the period of "friendship between the two peoples," do have money, and they also want to invest it.

The core of the future Chinatown is in the capital's 10th District, Kobanya. Most of the new immigrants have found homes in that blue-collar district. Some of them are already negotiating with the district mayor's office about buying real estate. A Chinese information office, called the "Joker," opened recently in one of the district's cultural centers.

Most of the new immigrants are from Beijing, Shanghai, or Fujian Province in southeast China. They are engaged mainly in export-import deals.

Hsiao, a 29-year-old pharmacist, arrived from Beijing last month, leaving his wife and young son behind. He hopes to have them join him once his business has picked up. At the moment, he is trying to find out what Hungarians want and to that end is conducting independent "market research" in the marketplace of a blue-collar district. On a bench he displays Chinese wares—tiger balm, fans, lingerie, watches, and all kinds of trinkets—on which he is offering very good bargains. His wares are selling like hot cakes.

Tong Chih, aged 30, had taught computer science at Shanghai University. He proudly shows his brand new Hungarian identity card. He arrived in Budapest at the beginning of this year and obtained Hungarian citizenship within a few months' time. In Budapest he has a boutique selling Chinese merchandise. With the help of Chinese acupuncturists and masseurs, he is planning to open a Chinese therapy ward in a Marcal hospital.

Attending special language courses organized for foreigners, the Chinese start studying Hungarian immediately after their arrival. They learn to count and acquire a basic vocabulary within a few weeks. Yet Hungarian is regarded as one of the most difficult languages in the world.



### More Pessimism, Devaluation of Institutions Noted

91EP0647B Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
27-28 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Tomasz Zukowski: "The Election and Life: Three Polands"]


[Text] Over the last week, the newspapers have been full of numbers and percents laboriously gathered by various research institutions. This huge amount of data, as well as a clearly felt climate of rivalry between newspapers, centers, and analysts for priority, accuracy, and attractiveness of their information, gives us a foretaste of what will happen this fall, when the "real" election—not the one from the one-thousand-persons "duchies of public opinion," which more or less accurately mirror the views of the majority of Poles—will take place. Forgetting for a moment about hurry and emotions, let us try to explain what really can be understood from all the data, besides a whole of series of names and numbers that resembles statistical reports from the Central Office of Statistics or from sports news.

### Moods in Society: More and More Criticism

Let us start from matters perhaps less attractive than preelection standings, but more important: the state of moods in society. The comparison of the results

achieved in July and the data from earlier reports from the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] or the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] leads to an unambiguous conclusion: Moods in society have definitely worsened over the last few months. Fewer and fewer Poles approve of the direction in socio-cultural changes taking place over the last dozen or so months. In July, only 29 percent of those surveyed (data from the Pentor Institute) believed that "the situation in Poland is headed in the right direction." The opposite opinion was held by 59 percent of those surveyed; the rest did not give a clear answer.

As I wrote in the Monday issue of ZYCIE, approval for the Balcerowicz program evidently declined between April and July; the greatest collapse took place, as the data from CBOS show, between May and April. What is interesting is that the popularity of the government chief, Prime Minister Bielecki, who realizes this strategy, remained at a relatively high level. Criticism toward the church's present activities increased a little: They are approved by 58 percent of those surveyed, but the percent who are unsatisfied has risen to 34 percent. This is accompanied by a polarization of public opinion towards legal protection of the unborn. The percent of antiabortion and pro-choice supporters increased at the expense of sympathizers of indirect solutions. But there are four-and-a-half-times more pro-choice people than




antiabortionists. The standings of the main state institutions, including the parliament and the president, declined. Those institutions in July, in contrast to a few months earlier, received more negative than positive evaluations of their work (the president almost twice as much; the Sejm more than four times).

### The Political Scene: The Contest Over the Rules of the Game

A result of a recent OBOP survey confirms the conclusions from the Saturday report in ZYCIE: The conflict over the voting regulations (more broadly, the sharp conflicts "on top") drew the attention of the minority of Poles who are the most politically active (which led to a partial reintegration in the Belveder [presidential] group, and in some extent to a weakening of the popularity of the [Democratic] Union group), bringing at the same time a decline in trust toward politicians and politics. It is no accident that the percent of persons who are ready to participate in the election decreased very distinctly between June (research by RZECZPOSPOLITA) and July (a survey for ZYCIE and another one for RZECZPOSPOLITA). If the voting took place tomorrow, only one-third of the eligible voters would participate in it. An interesting effect of the offensive of the Belveder group was a certain redefinition of the shape of the political scene. The main parameters determining society's thinking about public affairs and its attitude toward parties and politicians are not, as they were in April or May, so evidently its attitude toward economic strategy or toward the role of the church and of its social doctrine in public life. The importance of "decommunization," and of the debates around the scope of presidential powers and the creation of a movement supporting the president's actions, has grown. It turns out that, as shown by the data of the Pentor Institute, support for such a movement is slightly higher than approval of Lech Walesa's actions. This interesting phenomenon is confirmed by OBOP analyses, which document that distinct criticism of the president's actions appears together with expectations of a growth in the powers of the office.

### Three Polands

In November of last year, I wrote, in commenting on the results of the first round of the presidential election, that they brought a clear division of Poles into three separate political camps. This assertion is also relevant today, though the proportions between the sizes of the individual groups are slightly different. We have—to put it extremely simply—two camps of "active Poland." They are conducting a bitter conflict over power, a conflict that is also over the form of the exercise of that power, and over the method of the further road to a market economy. This is above all where the influence of the political parties is concentrated. The "third Poland" is those who declare their unwillingness to participate in public life, including elections. The degree of criticism from that third group (including both that segment which seems to be permanently passive, as well as that segment made up of people withdrawing from public



life) is qualitatively higher than that of people in the "active Poland" (see graphic). Approval of present economic strategy is also very low in this group.

We have then, I repeat, "three Polands." The first two are in conflict with one another; the third is silent. Silent and growing.

### Personnel, Structural Changes in Army Viewed

91EP0651 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish  
26 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Tadeusz Sobolewski: "Acceleration in the Army?"]

[Text] There appears to be no question as to the necessity of personnel and structural changes in the Polish Army. Rumors that have appeared recently as well as concrete facts indicate that a time of "acceleration" is approaching for the Army. During one of its most recent plenary debates, the Sejm made the decision to "civilianize" the MON [Ministry of National Defense].

Who will become the new minister of national defense? Reportedly, the president is considering several candidates. The greatest chance of being appointed to this post probably belongs to Lech Kaczynski (minister of state in the President's Chancellery, responsible for the country's security and defense). Other names as well are leaking out from the Belvedere Palace as, for example, Janusz Onyszkiewicz (the current deputy chief of the ministry responsible for, among other things, international contacts); Krzysztof Jan Zabinski (head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, member of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, regarded as "Bielecki's man"); and Wojciech Wlodarczyk (secretary of the President's Advisory Committee, secretary of the National Citizens Committee, and a longtime associate of Zdzislaw Najder). The following also stand a chance: Antoni Macierowicz (the president's security adviser and vice chairman of ZChN

[Christian-National Union] and purportedly even Jacek Merkel (head of Lech Walesa's election campaign, predecessor in L. Kaczynski's post). It is true that, in the case of this particular ministry, it is not insignificant who will stand at its head. No doubt, it will be a civilian who is to fulfill the role of, among other things, an instrument of political control over the Army. The selection of the right person in the country's current political situation is extremely difficult.

Above all, it is necessary to determine which one of the above presented individuals will be capable of placing national interests ahead of the private interests of their own party or community. What is needed is a strong, resolved individual capable of withstanding pressure and winning over the Army's officer corps. Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk will most likely become inspector general of the Armed Forces, although it is also possible that he will be appointed Poland's representative to NATO. The current minister stated clearly in one of his most recent interviews (KONFRONTACJE, May 91) that: "The military superiority of our neighbors to the East and West is evident. The existing ratio of forces on both principal azimuths permits the theoretical unleashing of aggression at any given time without the mobilizing recruitment of forces." However, at the same time he added reassuringly that "...the threat to the security of the Polish Republic is potential in nature at the present time and may become real only in the case of an extremely unfavorable turn in the military-political situation."

However, the conclusion to be derived is clear: Poland does not currently have any chances for self-reliance in a military sense. We have no military alliances with any country in the world. Allied declarations not supported by any specifics and existing only on paper do not provide any guarantees of security. The several Polish officers admitted to study at West Point (or some other Western military academies) and the emerging possibility of observing (and even—something that is being mentioned lately—the limited participation in) NATO forces maneuvers, will not change this fact. The Polish Army finds itself in a catastrophic situation. It is obvious that without a healthy economy, the Army's situation will not change.

In April, during a MON conference, Division General Franciszek Puchala (first deputy to the chief of General Staff) presented the current concepts of modernizing the Polish Army. Among other things, the creation of immediate response forces was planned. The heart of our military would be represented by assault-landing brigades, helicopter regiments, armored and motorized units, as well as specialized units (e.g., mountain infantry). It is indeed difficult to treat this other than as a collection of wishful thinking. Why, there was even talk about the possibility of manufacturing modern types of weapons (among others, a new type of armored transporter, the Irydion trainer-fighter plane, rifles), purchasing equipment (here, Spain, Italy, and Sweden came into play) and the purchase of several medium-class

warships (from South Korea). Meanwhile, money is lacking even for ongoing repairs. To carry out all plans, MON would need a minimum of 500 billion [zlotys] by the year 2000.

The current year budget, on the other hand, comes to 23.4 billion.

Minister Kolodziejczyk admitted openly in a June interview for WPROST that if in the second half of this year there will not be additional funds (today, it is already a well-known fact that budget cuts are an outright reality), then "we will simply have to inform the public that the possibilities of ensuring a minimum national defense capability will end." Instead, "families' only breadwinners" were called up, which the vice admiral explained explicitly: "We must place our stakes on quantity if we cannot afford quality." Currently, the Armed Forces of the RP [Republic of Poland] are 80-percent complete. For every three T-72 tanks, there is a shortage of one man. The only Polish airborne assault division has been reduced to a brigade (and even so, there are not enough aircraft to transport it). The Podhalanska Brigade (the only mountain infantry unit) has been reorganized into a guard regiment (funds are lacking for the purchase of snow skis and mountain-climbing equipment). The technical condition of our fighter helicopters leaves much to be desired; submarines are standing in docks. Unfortunately, these are not the only problems with which the new MON chief will be faced. The Polish Army is returning to traditional symbolism. However, the state of awareness of the officer corps, despite appearances, has not changed in a matter of one year. The Viritim conspiracy regards the changes to date in the Army as a camouflage of the old order. This organization has been active for two years now and includes nearly 300 officers (approximately 40 of them were dismissed from the Army). A dozen or so of its members have decided to come out in the open (including one general), but Viritim continues to be partially conspiratorial. It regards Minister Kolodziejczyk as its ideological adversary; civilian deputy ministers as incompetent and passive. Viritim claims that the restructuring thus far in the Army has been used for dismissing young, independently thinking officers. It is a fact that many former political officers have today switched over to the training-instruction or cultural-educational division. The conspiracy was able to gain the favor of several officers from the secret services. A study of the officers corps from the angle of the new Army's needs was carried out. The studies conducted by the GRUPAN team have been published in SPOTKANIE (No. 22). It turned out that barely 5 percent (i.e., nearly 2,500 officers are individuals with independent, progressive convictions who have the courage to openly voice their opinions; 10 percent display this courage only in a close, trusted circle, whereas 45 percent of the corps constitutes officers who are indifferent. On the other hand, 40 percent represent conservative views. It was also reported that 7 percent of the corps is made up of "agency collaborators."

Naturally, issues involving national defense should be protected by secrecy. However, in the present situation, there surely exists the pressing need for undertaking broad and open discussion on the shape of our future Army. Colonel Wiktor Alksnis (founder of the "Sojuz" conservative group and delegate to the People's Deputies Congress in the USSR) stated in an interview with WPROST: "...In the near future, Poland will be forced to turn to someone for safeguards for its borders, and all indications are that this will be the USSR." At the time of such remarks, questions such as the following arise: "Must history repeat itself? Has the time already come that views similar to those quoted above may be sent off to take their place only among archives?"

### New Tariffs Provide Some Relief to Farmers

91EP0659B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 2 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Edmund Szot: "The Border Is Closed and the Storerooms Are Open: August Is Kinder to Farmers"]

[Text] (C). August began more auspiciously for farmers. Since 1 August, the 23 July 1991 decree concerning tariffs for goods imported from abroad has been in effect. In this decree, tariff rates for agricultural-food products have been significantly increased, thereby ending the agony of farmers threatened by the curse of imported food and increasing the opportunity for them to sell their own products.

"This decree closes the period of the battle over protecting the agricultural market," said Adam Tanski, minister of agriculture and the food industry at a press conference. "The battle has ensued since January of this year. The government was charged with procrastination and ineffectuality on this matter; meanwhile, it was a carefully considered, expedient policy. There was no rush to introduce the new tariff rates. As a result of observations made about the significant surplus of agricultural-food export over import (this surplus has continued this year and totaled \$330 million for the first six months) as well as talks with the EEC, a new tariff was introduced into plans and it made no sense to precede it with temporary regulations. However, the import of food likewise played a positive role within the monopolized agricultural environment, which imposes prices at the expense of both producers and consumers."

Minister Tanski assured: "The new tariff rates will not cause an increase in food prices. Imported products will be replaced by domestic products, the supply of which currently exceeds demand. Both farmers and the food industry have reserves of these products. The new tariff will also protect the consumer from the consequences of the loss of sources of upkeep by a portion of farmers."

Mirosław Zielinski, chairman of the Main Customs Office, who participated in the conference, stated that in addition to the new tariff, another tool serving to tighten up the borders is the new tariff law, which will make possible repeated customs inspections within Poland

and will give tariff offices the right to question declared tariff value and set it at a realistic level.

Thus, no one who has succeeded in smuggling undeclared goods across the border can feel safe any longer. The practice of writing in fictitious prices on invoices, for example, two cents for a can of beer, will finally come to an end.

Thus, the farmer has gained greater assurance that his products will sell. This is particularly important now, during the harvest season. And that was the second topic of Thursday's conference: the harvests.

Traditionally, harvests have begun with the cutting of the cole. This year an area of 470,000 hectares is planted with cole (30,000 hectares less than a year ago). At yields of 23.8 quintals per hectare (which is 0.3 quintals less than a year ago), this represents a harvest of 1.1 million tons. Cole has already been cut from 60 percent of the area and 40 percent was already sold long ago to various companies that export it. Thus, 700,000 tons at most remain in Poland for processing, which is less than the fats industry can process. Nonetheless, this industry is taking this situation very lightly and is offering low procurement prices. According to PISiPAR [State Inspectorate of Procurement and State Administration of Agriculture] data, for example, farmers in the Krosno Voivodship are getting 841,000 zlotys per ton of cole. Plants are also trying to play the so-called pricing game in some other regions of Poland.

There are 8.666 million hectares of grain to be harvested (which is 135,000 hectares more than last year). Preliminary yield estimates indicate 31.7 quintals per hectares (this is 1.1 quintals per hectare less than a year ago). Thus, 27.5 million tons will be harvested, which will be only 0.5 million tons less than the record in 1990.

The grain harvest has just begun (5 to 10 percent of the area has been cut). As we have already noted, the storerooms are less full than they were a year ago; procurement enterprises have likewise obtained 2.5 billion in preferential credit for procurement purposes. It is estimated that this sum should suffice them until the end of August.

"But the grain balance will be unstable," anticipates Minister Tanski, "making grain more expensive next year."

And so, whoever does not have to sell right now should not hurry to sell his grain. The grain-milling industry should also take the forecasted price increase into consideration.

While the government has not relinquished its policy of liquidating inefficient economic units, it is trying to prevent a situation whereby bankrupted PGR [State Farms], for example, would have no reason to gather the harvest. Bank credit will be granted to them to make it possible for them to complete the harvest.

We have been informed by the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management that the average temperature is to be within the norm in August (17 to 18.2 degrees C), while precipitation will be below normal August levels of 51-80 mm. The second ten days of the month are expected to be the warmest. This is more good news for harvesters.

### **Livestock, Meat Product Imports Upset Farmers**

91EP0659A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 25 Jul 91 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Livestock on the Border: More Is Being Exported Than Imported"]

[Text] (C). During the last few months, protests against the import of slaughter and breeding animals from Western countries have increased. This applies in particular to protests against the import of such animals from the area of the former GDR. These protests have been lodged either as speeches made by deputies in the forum of the Sejm Agriculture and the Food Industry [MRiGZ] Commission, questions presented at plenary Sejm meetings, or as "news" reported in the columns of various newspapers. The protests are usually directed at the MRiGZ, and sometimes specifically at its Veterinary Department.

The logic of the protests against the import of livestock is the following: Polish farmers are having difficulty selling their farm products (for this reason, some of these products apparently drown in wells). This is another argument for stepping up the construction of waterworks in rural areas. Meanwhile, a tremendous number of livestock is being imported from abroad. This livestock is no better than Polish livestock; in fact, it is of significantly worse quality and is afflicted with leukemia, undulant fever, and other diseases. The protesters still do not accept the fact that no license is required for the importation of livestock because it is normal economic activity. Society fought for the freedom of this activity since the beginnings of the so-called commune and finally won it under the leadership of Solidarity.

Thus, the Veterinary Department cannot abrogate the economic freedoms won by society, for that is not its role. Nor is it the role of the MRiGZ as a whole. This ministry, which functions in the interest of Polish agriculture, can only propose the introduction of higher tariffs. These tariffs should not be exaggerated, however, for as we shall demonstrate with the use of figures, Polish agriculture may likewise suffer as a result of high tariffs. On the other hand, it is the task of the Veterinary Department to see that livestock imported for breeding purposes really are suitable for breeding and that meat from animals designated for slaughter is edible.

"The purpose of veterinary licenses is exclusively to define terms for protection of the health of animals and people," says Jozef Maleszewski, director of the Veterinary Department. "These licenses have been issued for more than 60 years on the basis of a 1927 presidential

decree. If we ascertain a positive immunological reaction in an animal designated for breeding, we order its return to the exporter. On the other hand, slaughter animals are not subjected to serological tests; they must only be clinically healthy and must be slaughtered within 72 hours of the time they cross the border. Livestock for slaughter is inspected before its slaughter, while meat is inspected again after an animal is slaughtered.

Thus, the inspector who does the veterinary examination is not concerned whether the animal is bony (such claims were made in the press) and small and whether the importation of livestock harms Polish agriculture.

Should such import be restricted through the use of high tariffs?

Over the course of the first half of 1991, 82,887 pigs and 80,742 head of cattle were imported. At the same time, 230,000 Polish animals left Poland through only one border point, in Zebrzydowice, with other countries as their final destination. Does the introduction of high tariffs lie in the interest of a country that often exports more than it imports?

The import of meat and processed meat products is another subject rocking agricultural communities. Recently we reported data on this subject provided by the Agricultural Market Agency. In the opinion of the Veterinary Department, this data is somewhat low. In the first half of 1991, during a border inspection, the import of 43,330 tons of pork, 29,296 tons of beef, and 74,938 tons of other kinds of meat and meat products were registered. However, meat brought in by tourists, for example, is not registered.

"If, of the 20 million Poles who cross the border, each one brings in only a few kilograms of pork meat products and canned meat, the total is enormous," observes Director Maleszewski. "Is it possible, then, to introduce a complete ban on the import of food?"

But then we would have to expect corresponding decisions from the other side.

### **Status, Quality of Oat Production Noted**

91EP0658B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 26 Jul 91 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Dietitians Recommend: Let Us Take an Example From Horses"]

[Text] [Excerpts] [passage omitted] Oat is a plant quite underestimated in Poland. This is above all because its values are little known. The decline of cultivated acreage of oats is caused, to be sure, above all by the systematic decrease in the number of horses (from 2,585,000 in 1970 to around 930,000 this year), but a decline in consumption of products from oats need not go along with this. We are trying to encourage not so much an increased role for oats in the sown area, as an increase in

the percentage of foods made with oats in the diet of the average Pole. [passage omitted]

In Germany, where over the course of the last 30 years consumption of products from that grain has grown 10-fold, and in the British Isles, where oatmeal has been eaten for years, the multifaceted values of oats have been recognized. In Poland, the consumption of oat products has declined since the war by half, and is now at around 10,000 tons (in Great Britain, it is 100,000 tons).

One of the reasons for the low consumption of oat products in Poland is probably [that it is used in only] one form, that is, in the form of oat flakes. Neither oat bread nor oatcakes (cakes made from oat flakes, with cocoa, are exquisite) are produced here; there are no products like instant oatmeal. Meanwhile, the low quality of milk discourages more frequent eating of oatmeal.

Oats are cultivated on around 700,000 hectares in Poland. With a yield approaching 30 quintals per hectare, this gives a crop on the order of two million tons. If only one percent of this crop was designated for direct consumption, that consumption would double.

### **Rye Harvest Menaced by High Costs, Low Demand**

91EP0658A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 23 Jul 91 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Salvation in Whiskey? Rye Bottleneck"]

[Text] For hundreds of years, rye was the chief grain in Poland. Because of the great predominance of light soils, it was cultivated much more often than other kinds of grain. This year, for the first time, the acreage of rye is less than that of wheat, coming to 2,270,000 hectares (wheat has 2,330,000 hectares). Despite this, rye producers have never before felt such anxieties about their harvests as this year. "Our State Grain Elevators have announced that they will not buy rye at all," reports Bolesława Florczykowska, senior provincial inspector in Białystok, "and [rye] is here one-third of the total grain crop, while half of the rye is commercial production. Even now, two weeks before harvest, desperate farmers come to us asking for us to intervene; unfortunately, we are not able to help them. Every year, 70 to 85 tons of rye are purchased in Białystok province. It is cultivated on 79,100,000 hectares in the province this year. There are, however, provinces where the acreage of rye is even greater: Siedlce, with 124,500,000 hectares; Radom, with 112,300,000 hectares; Piotrków, with 107,600,000 hectares; Ostrołęka, with 102,800,000 hectares; and Ciechanów, with 90,100,000 hectares. The grain and flour industry maintains that the stores of rye it has amassed are sufficient for at least 10 months. Locally, stores surpass even a two-year need. One of the deputies on the Sejm Agriculture and Food Economy Committee predicts that farmers will not harvest their rye this year. First of all, because they will not be able to dispose of it,

and second, because harvesting itself costs money. Andrzej Rutkowski, assistant director of the Agriculture Department in the Provincial Administration in Ciechanów, says that in his province, farmer circle cooperatives demand 500,000 to 600,000 zlotys per hour for operation of a combine. In Białystok, the price of this service is somewhat lower (400,000 zlotys) but the number of clients is significantly lowered at such a price, too. The arithmetic is not complicated: With an average yield of 27 quintals of rye per hectare, and a purchase price of 50,000 zlotys per quintal, the sale of grain from a hectare brings 1,350,000 zlotys. This means that almost half of this must be paid to the combine operator (600,000 zlotys). Add to this the costs of transport of the grain, of drying, of transport of grain to the purchase point (if a buyer can be found!), and the balance does not come out very encouragingly. And, after all, a yield of 27 quintals per hectare will not be achieved everywhere. Therefore, it is supposed that there are some farmers who, after insuring their grain, will burn it in the field. "Why doesn't the [ministry] advise us what we should plant instead of rye?" ask farmers. The choice is in fact not very great. Few plants give sufficient yields in light soils. Some of these lands should be forested, and not only for this reason. There is a program to increase the forestation of the country to 30 percent, which would mean the necessity of carrying out forestation on an area of 700,000 to 800,000 hectares. The overwhelming majority of land earmarked for this goal will be the weakest land, meaning rye soils. But this is a program for the next dozen or so years. For now, it is necessary to find ways of managing the rye from this year's harvest. [It is necessary to] attract interest in rye on the part of exporters, bakers, alcohol producers, etc. Farmers themselves must also be reminded that, skilfully adapted, rye can be a component of feed. The worst choice definitely would be attempts to burn the grain in the field.

### **List of 80 Top Polluting Firms Reexamined**

91EP0665A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 29 Jul 91 p I

[Article by Krystyna Forowicz: "Poisoners With Their Backs to the Wall"]

[Text] The residents of Bytom remember April of last year and the celebration of World Earth Day. The minister of environmental protection at that time promised with his hand on his heart that the Bobrek Steelworks would be closed before the end of the year.

For the time being there is no minister, but the Bobrek Steelworks and Carbide Works continue to function, although the deadline for the closing of these plants passed toward the end of last year. The Chodaków "Chemitex" Chemical Textile Works in Sochaczew did not comply with the orders of the Ministry of Environmental Protection or the Ecological Police. The Rzeszów Landing Lights Plant "Polam" in Podgwiszów Nowy actually stopped production, but it did not take any

actions to eliminate the 30 "wild dumps" of mercury-contaminated broken glass. The Phosphoric Fertilizer Works in Gdansk continues to pollute the Vistula River.

In January of last year, the Ministry of Environmental Protection drew up a list of the greatest damagers of water, soil, and air on the national scale. The list was published in the columns of our newspaper. These plants (80 of them were counted) were obliged to undertake proecology activities, to build or modernize protective equipment on their grounds, and to straighten out and discipline all the actions taken in support of limiting danger. The former minister of environmental protection announced in January of last year that he was taking radical steps with respect to the poisoners and closing those plants that evidently harm the health and the life of people. We announced in the columns of our newspaper that we were going to track these actions.

Last year the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate [PIOS] conducted more than 90 inspections in plants from the "list of 80." This year it envisions considerably more. Three-fourths of the publicly censured plants, guided by the instinct for self-preservation, are endeavoring to do a little bit. Preparations are underway to construct waste-water treatment plants, to install new electrical precipitators, and to modernize environmental protection equipment. These activities are not always sufficient. For the extractive industry and metallurgy, deep restructuring changes are essential. In the copper industry, in the opinion of PIOS, the transformations should aim at significantly reducing production—by as much as half—and simultaneously putting a plant into operation to produce highly processed copper. The current method of exploitation leads to the drastic and rapid exhaustion of copper reserves. The low level of processing does not bring significant economic effects. The inspectorate is also waiting for the construction of a plant that will exploit accumulated lead-bearing waste, which is burdensome to the environment.

The Environmental Protection Department also demands that the extraction of sulphur from deposits in the southern part of the Tarnobrzek Voivodship be reduced and that the construction of the Osiek and Basznia mines be suspended. It points to other possibilities for gaining sulphur, such as removing sulphur from natural gas, coal, and liquid fuels. The introduction of these changes will have a double effect: It will considerably limit emissions of sulphur compounds into the air and also protect deposits of this resource.

Twenty-six plants from the "list of 80" have so far not managed to propose real programs for quickly removing threats to the environment. They have been ordered to partially or completely suspend production. Only some have listened: "Polam" in Rzeszow, the "Siechnice" Steelworks, the Soda Works in Krakow, and some departments in the "Hajduki" Chemical Works in Chorzow and the "Miasteczko Slaskie" Zinc Works, which are harmful to people and the local environment.

The operations of nine rolldown furnaces in the "Boleslaw" Mining and Metallurgy Works in Bukowno have been suspended, as well as departments producing carbolic acid and aminobenzene in "Organice-Zachem" in Bydgoszcz and electrolysis departments in "Organice-Azot" in Jaworzno. In sum, the fate of 12 plants that do not give fair promise for improvement has been sealed. Others have appealed administrative decisions. For example, the "Walbrzych" Coking Plant is bringing suit in the Supreme Administrative Court. The Nitrogen Works in Tarnow, "Siarkopol" in Gdansk, and the "Victoria" thermal-electric power plant in Walbrzych have filed appeals.

What fate will befall the "Czeczot," "Piast," and "Ziemowit" mines, which also have their backs to the wall and which have still not elaborated plans for desalinizing pit waters? In 17 plants, significant delays in proecology investments have appeared. The "Turow" Power Plant in Bogatynia will not be able to manage with a change of electrical precipitators; it did not meet the deadline to evict the residents from the protective zone.

The ministry announced that the epoch of impunity for ecological criminals will end and that within two to three years—five years in exceptional cases—extreme sources of onerousness will be eliminated. Not all voivodships and plants have taken these words to heart—as one can see.

#### **Rehabilitation Community for Addicts Planned**

91EP0656A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 5 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by Grazyna Rutowska: "Victoria Kotan"]

[Text] Among the 100,000 Polish drug addicts age 10 to 40 years, 18- to 24-year-olds make up the largest group. Statistics show that 800 persons are poisoned by drugs annually and more than 100 die from overdoses.

Sociologists, psychologists, and therapists maintain that addicts are created at home, at school, in their own backyards, in camp—everywhere. As Marek Kotanski has said, drug addiction is the result of attitudes, views and actions of adult society, and especially of the lack of rearing in the home and school. Young people desiring to experience something new and fascinating—in their opinion—something that would allow them to escape from every-day life, reach for drugs. They do not take into account the fact that this is a fatal trap.

In order for a drug to take its toll, it must fall on suitable ground, and such ground is provided by the young who have lost their ideals, are left to themselves, abandoned by family and closest friends, frustrated.

In Poland there are few places in which lost youth can learn to live normally. MONAR, a movement organized in 1978, originally known as Young Peoples Movement To Combat Drug Addiction, and created by Master Mark Kotanski, has played a very important role.

The first house for addicts opened in Gloskowo near Garwolina. There, in a manor house with farm buildings on several hectares of land, young people laid the framework of a monastery-like society. Cooperative work became the foundation of the system. Work was not for pay, but for self and others. The main principle was obligatory: complete partnership, total abstinence from drugs and alcohol (and recently also from nicotine). Value was restored to the words friendship, love, courage, sincerity, loyalty, altruism. All affairs of the household and community were discussed jointly, each person had the right to express himself freely....

Soon MONAR became a system of several establishments. Today it manages 19 houses of resocialization for drug addicts in which approximately 600 young people who want to be cured of the habit find shelter. In addition, in all of Poland there are 17 counseling centers where addicts and their parents may seek advice. Recently, a mobile counseling center in a "Jelcz" bus adapted for the purpose and an ambulance service for addicts were organized in Warsaw.

Thus far, owing to the activity of MONAR, approximately 3,000 individuals have broken the drug habit and been permanently cured.

A year ago, Marek Kotanski organized a different society, "Plus—Solidarity With AIDS Victims," which at this time has two establishments for the ill and maintains counseling centers and a confidential AIDS telephone hotline.

Most recently, much has been said about the strong manifestations of unusual intolerance of our society toward addicts and those ill with AIDS. The press has published information about numerous violent acts (specifically in Gloskowo and Kaweczyna) toward the ill as well as toward spokespersons on their behalf.

A unique response to this nightmare is the initiative of the MONAR chief: finding a safe place, creating a town in which the word "tolerance" will not be just a word.

The town will be a kind of island for people rejected, alone, ill, people who think differently and cannot accept reality. This town, although organized like others in Europe such as Christiania in Copenhagen, will be different and original.

"'Victoria Kotan,' for that is what it has been named, will be a town of good interpersonal relations, an oasis of warmth, tolerance, and love," said Marek Kotanski. "It is located in the village Lutynki in Zielona Gora Voivodship, not far from Zary. The first settlers, my former wards, went there at the beginning of May of this year. Thus far they succeeded in repairing a devastated building, our future town hall, the seat of authority of the town, as well as the farm buildings.

"The laws of our town are simple: respect for self and others, helping others at any time of day or night, sharing everything one has, and, obviously, abstinence from drugs and alcohol. The main street of the town will be named Tolerance.

"We will probably build a brickworks. Bricks from our brickworks and lumber from windfalls will enable us to build single-story houses. Anyone who wants to and accepts our laws will be able to live in our 'little families' of seven or eight people.

"On 50 hectares of arable land, we will produce what we need. We want the town to have an international character. Discussions are going forward with Germans and Russians. We will also build a church in which everyone will be able to pray to his own God.

"I am moved and obligated," Marek Kotanski adds. "Gifts have started to arrive from everywhere in response to our appeal for help. Help in repairing the buildings and establishing the new town has been given specifically by the glass works in Kunice, the division of the Polish Army in Zaganie, the chip board plant in Zary, the construction ceramics plant in Gostinia, 'Polifarb' in Wroclaw, the residents of the Wymiarka commune and the village, Lutynka, as well as by the local authorities. I thank them for this. On my part, I can assure them that they will not be disappointed in us, the residents of the town 'Victoria Kotan.'"



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